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ADMINISTERING THE TAX SYSTEM WE HAVE 
KRISTIN E. HICKMAN† 
ABSTRACT 
  Traditional perceptions of tax exceptionalism from administrative-
law doctrines and requirements have been predicated at least in part 
on the importance of the tax code’s revenue-raising function. Yet, 
Congress increasingly relies on the Internal Revenue Service to 
administer government programs that have little to do with raising 
revenue and much more to do with distributing government benefits 
to the economically disadvantaged, subsidizing approved activities, 
and regulating outright certain economic sectors like nonprofits, 
pensions, and health care. As the attentions of the Treasury 
Department and Internal Revenue Service shift away from raising 
revenue and toward these other matters, the revenue-based 
justification for tax exceptionalism from general administrative-law 
norms fades. To demonstrate the shift, the Article incorporates 
empirical analysis of Treasury Department and Internal Revenue 
Service regulatory activity over time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United 
States,1 the Supreme Court rejected tax exceptionalism from 
administrative-law requirements and doctrines absent justification.2 
Yet, many tax-administrative practices do not comport precisely with 
general administrative-law norms. 
Some differences are most likely due to a combination of 
specialization, cloistering, path dependence, and litigation strategy, as 
attorneys have failed to recognize or declined to mention tax 
departures from general administrative-law norms and generalist 
judges have relied on attorneys’ briefs.3 For example, tax lawyers and 
administrators have a longstanding habit of labeling general authority 
regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) as 
“interpretative rules,” even though such regulations are legally 
 
 1. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). 
 2. See id. at 713 (“[W]e are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review 
good for tax law only.”). 
 3. See Kristin E. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or Deliberate 
Strategy?, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 89, 92 (2011) (identifying litigation strategy as a partial 
explanation for tax departures from general administrative-law norms); see also Paul Caron, Tax 
Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 
531–89 (1994) (highlighting several areas, including tax administration, in which a “tax is 
different” mindset has yielded tax exceptionalism in the law). See generally Robert Glicksman & 
Richard Levy, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499 (2011) (describing how 
specialization, cloistering, and path dependence lead to judicial divergence from administrative-
law norms, with tax as one example). 
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binding and thus “legislative” in general administrative-law parlance.4 
As a result, for many years prior to Mayo, generalist courts and tax 
litigants talked past each other, and briefs in tax cases regularly failed 
to alert courts to the disagreement over whether the tax-specific 
National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States5 standard of review6 
survived the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,7 leading to a jurisprudential 
mess.8 The same habit of terminology has caused Treasury to claim 
routinely that most of its regulations are not subject to notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure 
Act9 (APA), even as the regulations bind taxpayers and the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) alike—a circumstance that is currently 
causing jurisprudential mischief.10 
Other tax deviations from general administrative-law norms are 
the result of congressional choice. For example, administrative-law 
doctrine interprets the APA as requiring a presumption in favor of 
judicial review for legal challenges against final agency actions.11 In 
the tax context, Congress has deliberately limited judicial review with 
the Anti-Injunction Act,12 Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 7421, 
although the full scope of that limitation is unclear. Retroactive 
rulemaking typically is not an option for other agencies.13 By 
 
 4. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3, at 520 (observing the habit). See generally Kristin 
E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with 
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727 (2007) 
(examining the incidence and legal validity of characterizing Treasury regulations as exempt 
from APA notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements). 
 5. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
 6. Id. at 477. 
 7. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 8. Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of Respondent at 16–
19, Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (No. 09-
837), 2010 WL 3934618, at *16–19; see also Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3, at 516–26 
(connecting the legislative and interpretative terminology discrepancy with pre-Mayo judicial 
confusion over whether Treasury regulations were Chevron eligible); Kristin E. Hickman, The 
Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 
1556–59, 1563–89 (2006) (documenting the origins of the pre-Mayo judicial confusion at greater 
length).  
 9. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012). 
 10. See generally Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3 (observing this condition); Hickman, 
supra note 4 (documenting this position empirically). 
 11. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). 
 12. Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421 (2012). 
 13. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (rejecting retroactive 
rulemaking by agencies absent express congressional authorization). 
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comparison, Congress has explicitly given Treasury broad authority 
to adopt retroactively applicable regulations in I.R.C. § 7805(b).14 
Further, in response to claims that Treasury’s use of temporary 
regulations violates APA notice-and-comment rulemaking 
requirements, the government has argued that I.R.C. § 7805(e) 
expressly authorizes it to do so.15 
Whatever the origins of the differences between tax-
administrative practices and general administrative-law norms, courts 
and scholars often invoke the importance of revenue raising to 
explain or defend tax exceptionalism. Long before Mayo, in Bull v. 
United States,16 the Supreme Court justified special limitations on a 
taxpayer’s ability to challenge tax assessments and collections on the 
ground that “taxes are the life-blood of government, and their prompt 
and certain availability an imperious need.”17 Professor Steve Johnson 
has identified the “revenue imperative” as the claimed justification 
for “several features of tax administration that uniquely advantage” 
the IRS, including the Anti-Injunction Act limitation on judicial 
review of Treasury and IRS actions.18 Writing for the Court in Bob 
Jones University v. Simon,19 Justice Powell similarly concluded that 
“the principal purpose” of the Anti-Injunction Act is “the protection 
of the Government’s need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously 
as possible with a minimum of pre-enforcement judicial 
interference.”20 Citing several cases, Nina Olson, the National 
Taxpayer Advocate, has linked the revenue-raising function to 
judicial reluctance to impose common procedural due process 
requirements upon IRS revenue-collection efforts.21 Some tax 
 
 14. I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2012). 
 15. See Brief for the United States at 29, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 
132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139), 2011 WL 5591822, at *29 (citing I.R.C. § 7805(e) as 
“granting the Treasury Department authority to issue temporary regulations”); Brief for the 
Appellant at 51–52, Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. United States, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1204), 2010 WL 6210551, at *51–52 (“If the absence of notice and comment 
could deprive temporary regulations of validity, then § 7805(e) is meaningless.”). 
 16. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935). 
 17. Id. at 259–60. 
 18. Steve Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX 
REV. 269, 279–80 (2012); see also Nina E. Olson, Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, 2010 Erwin N. 
Griswold Lecture Before the American College of Tax Counsel: Taking the Bull by Its Horns: 
Some Thoughts on Constitutional Due Process in Tax Collection (Jan. 23, 2010), in 63 TAX 
LAW. 227, 232 (2010) (making a similar connection regarding the Anti-Injunction Act). 
 19. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974). 
 20. Id. at 736. 
 21. Olson, supra note 18 at 230–33. 
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scholars have invoked Treasury’s authority to promulgate retroactive 
tax regulations as an important tool for protecting the fisc from 
“abuse.”22 Somewhat ironically, prior to Mayo, the American Bar 
Association Tax Section’s Task Force on Judicial Deference cited the 
IRS’s revenue-raising role as the most important argument in favor of 
denying rather than extending Chevron deference to most Treasury 
regulations, claiming that “[t]his function of the IRS may encourage 
the agency to issue rulings or to promulgate regulations that test the 
outer limits of reasonableness.”23 
Anecdotally, defenders of tax exceptionalism often emphasize 
the difficulty that Treasury and the IRS face in keeping up with 
sophisticated and aggressive tax planners and tax shelter promoters 
whose schemes defy the spirit of the tax laws, or in combatting 
outright scofflaws who would delay or avoid paying their taxes by 
tying up the government in frivolous lawsuits. Certainly such groups 
exist, consume scarce administrative resources, and threaten the fisc. 
But the government’s reliance on tax collection notwithstanding, it 
does not necessarily follow that raising revenue is the only, or even 
the primary, focus of the contemporary U.S. tax system and those 
charged with administering it.24 The I.R.C. now contains hundreds of 
 
 22. Edward A. Morse, Reflections on the Rule of Law and “Clear Reflection of Income”: 
What Constrains Discretion?, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 445, 487–88 (1999); see also Marvin 
A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Essay, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1956–57 (2005) (advocating retroactive rulemaking as a means of 
combatting abusive tax shelters); Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and 
Legal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 232–35 (2003) (same). 
 23. IRVING SALEM, ELLEN P. APRILL & LINDA GALLER, ABA SECTION OF TAXATION: 
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL DEFERENCE, in 57 TAX LAW. 717, 724–25 (2004). 
 24. In discussing the U.S. tax system, I am contemplating the I.R.C.—Title 26 of the U.S. 
Code—as administered by Treasury and the IRS. One could argue instead that tax-system 
administration concerns revenue assessment and collection efforts across agencies. Many other 
federal government agencies are responsible for administering taxes, tariffs, levies, fees, 
penalties, and other payments that contribute to the fisc. For example, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security, is 
responsible for administering duties and fines on imported goods. See generally J.F. Chester & 
Sophilia Hsu, Going Global: A Legal Primer for Innovation- and Knowledge-Based Companies, 
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J., Summer 2012, at 3 (describing the CBP’s role in administering 
import laws); International Fashion Trends: The Business of International Fashion Law, 21 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 795, 820 (2013) (comparing the CBP to the IRS). Also, for a 
particularly interesting article criticizing the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s administration of 
a user fee levied by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, see Charles E. Smith, Air 
Transportation Taxation: The Case for Reform, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 915, 927–35 (2010). 
Nevertheless, I think most evaluations of the U.S. tax system and U.S. tax administration as 
such concern the I.R.C., Treasury, and the IRS. Also, the instances of tax exceptionalism from 
administrative-law norms that I discuss in this Article concern the I.R.C., Treasury, and the IRS. 
HICKMAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2014  9:13 AM 
1722 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1717 
tax expenditure items representing more than $1 trillion of indirect 
government spending each year. Former Joint Committee on 
Taxation Chief of Staff Edward Kleinbard has called tax expenditures 
“the dominant instruments for implementing new discretionary 
spending policies.”25 As further observed by former Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy Pamela Olson, 
The continual enactment of targeted tax provisions leaves the IRS 
with responsibility for the administration of policies aimed at the 
environment, conservation, green energy, manufacturing, 
innovation, education, saving, retirement, health care, child care, 
welfare, corporate governance, export promotion, charitable giving, 
governance of tax exempt organizations, and economic 
development, to name a few.26 
Following a similar theme, several former IRS Commissioners 
recently advised the D.C. Circuit that “Congress has decided to 
administer an increasingly wide variety of government assistance 
programs through the federal income tax system, including assistance 
for low income families, health care, education, and homebuyers.”27 
Congress may perceive the non-revenue-raising aspects of the 
I.R.C. to be minor and peripheral to the I.R.C.’s core revenue-raising 
function; so, for that matter, may defenders of tax exceptionalism who 
focus their gaze on those taxpayers who resort to aggressive measures 
to avoid paying taxes. But what if that perception is no longer 
accurate? As the former IRS Commissioners observed, “Congress’s 
willingness to use its taxing power to effectuate public policies in 
areas such as health care has fundamentally changed the roles of the 
tax return and tax return preparers.”28 If the efforts of tax 
administrators are likewise increasingly focused on programs, 
purposes, and functions other than raising revenue, then what ought 
to be the implications for instances of tax exceptionalism in 
administration that are premised on the revenue-raising function? 
 
 25. Edward D. Kleinbard, Professor of Law, Woodworth Memorial Lecture: The Congress 
Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes 
(May 7, 2009), in 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010). 
 26. Pamela F. Olson, Woodworth Memorial Lecture: And Then Cnut Told 
Reagan . . . Lessons from the Tax Reform Act of 1986, (May 6, 2010), in 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
1, 12–13 (2011) (citations omitted). 
 27. Brief Amici Curiae of Former Commissioners of Internal Revenue in Support of 
Defendants-Appellants at 22, Loving v. IRS, No. 13-5061 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5, 2013), 2013 WL 
1386248, at *22. 
 28. Id. at 4. 
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Drawing from a much larger and ongoing empirical study of tax 
administration and Treasury regulations, this Article offers a 
preliminary snapshot of the extent to which the efforts of 
contemporary tax administrators focus on programs, purposes, and 
functions other than raising revenue.29 The Article focuses on 
Treasury regulations—proposed, temporary, and final—promulgated 
by Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy with the help of members of the 
IRS Chief Counsel’s Office between January 1, 2008, and December 
31, 2012. To provide context for the empirical analysis, Part I of this 
Article offers a qualitative discussion of the different goals, purposes, 
and functions of the contemporary U.S. tax system. Turning to the 
empirical study, Part II outlines study methodology and reports the 
results. Specifically, the study classified major Treasury regulation 
documents by subject matter and evaluated them both document by 
document and project by project, outright and based on relative page 
length. Across measures, between 30 percent and 40 percent of 
observations fell into subject matter categories that are most clearly 
oriented toward programs, purposes, and functions other than 
traditional revenue raising. Another 25 percent of observations fell 
into subject matter categories that arguably serve dual functions. In 
short, a lot—maybe even a majority—of the effort that Treasury and 
the IRS spend promulgating Treasury regulations concerns programs, 
purposes, and functions other than raising revenue. In light of the 
study’s findings, Part III of the Article suggests that Congress ought 
to reconsider, or at least adjust, some of the statutory exceptions from 
administrative-law requirements that it has adopted in the tax 
context. Alternatively, or in addition, where the scope of some of 
those exceptions is in doubt, courts ought to consider construing the 
relevant statutory language in a manner that minimizes its deviation 
from general administrative-law norms. 
I.  THE TAX SYSTEM’S COMPETING FUNCTIONS 
Raising revenue is obviously a key function of any tax system. As 
the saying goes, “Taxes are what we pay for civilized society . . . .”30 
Taxes provide the funds needed for the government to do all of the 
things that we, as citizens, ask it to do to make our society more 
 
 29. Distinguishing revenue raising from other programs, purposes, and functions is not 
always obvious, easy, or even possible. See infra Parts I and II.B. 
 30. Compañía Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 
100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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civilized: building roads and supporting schools; shielding consumers 
from adulterated food and mislabeled pharmaceuticals; enforcing safe 
workplaces and protecting the environment; and providing a basic 
social safety net. The guiding purpose of the U.S. tax system 
historically has been, and to some extent still is, to raise revenue. The 
culture, practices, and procedures of the IRS, in particular, are 
oriented toward the mission of raising revenue.31 Nina Olson has 
described the IRS as “the federal government’s accounts receivable 
department.”32 As Figure 1 demonstrates, the tax administration 
efforts of Treasury and the IRS yield a lot of revenue for the 
government—mostly, though not exclusively, from the individual 
income tax and employment taxes. 
  
 
 31. E.g., John F. Coverdale, Legislating in the Dark: How Congress Regulates Tax-Exempt 
Organizations in Ignorance, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 809, 837–38 (2010) (“The IRS is essentially a 
tax collection agency, and its culture reflects that reality.”); Francine J. Lipman, Access to Tax 
InJustice, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1173, 1195–96 (2013) (describing the mismatch between the IRS’s 
collection-oriented culture, practices, and procedures, and the needs of low-income taxpayers 
claiming the earned income tax credit (EITC)); Shu-Yi Oei, Getting More by Asking Less: 
Justifying and Reforming Tax Law’s Offer-in-Compromise Procedure, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 
1119 (2012) (suggesting that the IRS’s “fundamental collection mission” and “enforcement 
culture” get in the way of its administering the Offer In Compromise program). 
 32. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 
TO CONGRESS 40 (2012), available at http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/Full-
Report/Volume-1.pdf.  
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Figure 1. IRS Revenue Collections by Type of Tax, Fiscal Year 201233 
(Money amounts in thousands of dollars) 
Type of Tax Gross Collections 
% of 
Total 
Individual and estate and trust income taxes[a] 1,387,836,515 55.0 
Employment taxes: Old-Age, Survivors, 
Disability, and Hospital Insurance (OASDHI), 
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), 
Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA), 





Business income taxes[b] 281,461,580 11.1 
Excise taxes 56,174,937 2.2 
Estate and gift taxes 14,450,249 0.6 
Total 2,524,320,134 100.0 
[a] Includes $37.3 million in Presidential Election Campaign Fund contributions. 
[b] Includes $496 million from the unrelated business income tax imposed on tax-exempt 
organizations, which is less than .05 percent of total collections. 
 
The I.R.C. is not and probably could never be entirely value 
neutral. For example, Congress seems doomed to choose between 
disfavoring single individuals or married couples in determining the 
income tax rate brackets and the standard deduction.34 Further, many 
longstanding features of the I.R.C. deliberately pursue social welfare 
or regulatory goals in the course of raising revenue. The progressive 
structure of the individual income tax is frequently justified at least 
partly as a remedy for societal inequality.35 Although the estate tax 
was adopted largely to raise revenue, combatting inequality was a 
driver there also,36 and contemporary defenders of the estate tax 
 
 33. The information in Figure 1 derives from the IRS Data Book for the fiscal year ended 
September 30, 2012. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREAS., INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2012, at 3 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/
12databk.pdf. 
 34. Tax experts have been debating this issue for decades. See generally, e.g., Lily Kahng, 
One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 
651 (2010); Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 35. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A 
PROBLEM IN FISCAL POLICY 15–19 (1938); Meredith R. Conway, Money, It’s a Crime. Share It 
Fairly, but Don’t Take a Slice of My Pie!: The Legislative Case for the Progressive Income Tax, 
39 J. LEGIS. 119, 130–32 (2013). 
 36. Jeffrey A. Cooper, Ghosts of 1932: The Lost History of Estate and Gift Taxation, 9 FLA. 
TAX REV. 875, 882 (2010). 
HICKMAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2014  9:13 AM 
1726 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1717 
continue to invoke that concern as a rationale for its retention.37 
Historical evidence suggests that Congress enacted the corporate 
income tax not only to raise revenue but also to provide a mechanism 
by which the government could regulate corporate activity and 
constrain corporate political power.38 
Indeed, taxes are routinely recognized as a tool in the regulatory 
toolbox.39 The federal income tax is littered with provisions that are 
not based on anyone’s conception of an ideal tax base, but rather are 
motivated by a desire to encourage some behaviors and discourage 
others. For example, the I.R.C. authorizes income tax deductions for 
charitable contributions40 and denies income tax deductions for 
bribes,41 political lobbying,42 and excessive compensation.43 Excise 
taxes are another example, and the I.R.C. contain dozens.44 Although 
they are now actually collected by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
 
 37. See generally, e.g., Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the 
Estate Tax To Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255 (2013) 
(invoking societal inequality as a rationale for retaining the estate tax). 
 38. STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 43–44 (2010) (acknowledging that regulatory 
goals were present but considering them secondary); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, 
Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Income Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1217–20 
(2004) (citing historical evidence in justifying the continuation of the corporate income tax on 
regulatory grounds). See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the 
Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990) (documenting regulatory goals 
driving the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 as a precursor to the modern corporate income tax). 
 39. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 277–78 (1987) 
(recognizing taxation as a tool for controlling risk); Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory 
Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 581 
(1979) (discussing tax as a regulatory tool). 
 40. I.R.C. § 170 (2012). This deduction has been part of the individual income tax since 
1921. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a)(11), 42 Stat. 227, 241. 
 41. I.R.C. § 162(c). Deductions for “improper” payments to foreign officials or employees 
were disallowed in 1958. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 5, 72 Stat. 
1606, 1608. In 1969, Congress expanded I.R.C. § 162(c) and adopted language that more closely 
resembles the current provision. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. § 91-172, § 902(b), 83 
Stat. 487, 710. 
 42. I.R.C. § 162 (e). 
 43. Id. § 162(m). The deduction limitations for political lobbying and excessive 
compensation were both adopted in 1993. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 
No. 103-66, §§ 13211(a), 13222(a), 107 Stat. 312, 469–71, 477–79 (codified as amended at I.R.C. 
§ 162(e), (m) (2012)). 
 44. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREAS., PUBLICATION 510 
(2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p510.pdf (describing a few dozen excise taxes 
in the I.R.C.). 
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and Firearms, “sin taxes” on liquor45 and cigarettes46 have been part of 
the I.R.C. for several decades—whether to discourage their use, to 
offset the cost of their negative social consequences, or both. The 
I.R.C. taxes crude oil and petroleum products, ozone-depleting 
chemicals, and gas-guzzling vehicles to protect the environment,47 and 
vaccines to fund the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
and compensate the families of children adversely affected by 
vaccination,48 among other excise tax examples. 
Even some longstanding deductions that we now regard as 
serving primarily non-revenue-raising goals at one time may have 
been considered relatively value neutral or definitionally essential in 
computing net income. In writing about tax incentives, Professor 
Stanley Surrey described several tax provisions that “are now 
defended on incentive grounds” as having “cloudy” origins.49 The 
deduction for home mortgage interest is illustrative. Individual 
taxpayers have been able to deduct home mortgage interest since 
Congress first enacted the income tax in 1913.50 Today, tax experts 
consider the deduction for home mortgage interest to be a tax 
expenditure item aimed at promoting homeownership.51 Yet, the 
Revenue Act of 191352 did not mention home mortgage interest 
 
 45. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 5001 (imposing taxes on distilled spirits and wines produced in or 
imported into the United States). These taxes have existed since at least 1958. Excise Tax 
Changes Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-859, § 201, 72 Stat. 1275, 1313–14 (1958) (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. §§ 5001–5693 (2012)). 
 46. See I.R.C. § 5701 (imposing taxes on cigars, cigarettes, and other tobacco products 
manufactured in or imported into the United States). These taxes have existed since at least 
1954. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 52, § 5701, 68A Stat. 1, 705 (1954) (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 5701 (2012)). 
 47. I.R.C. §§ 4064, 4611–4612, 4681–4682. See generally Janet E. Milne, Environmental 
Taxation in the United States: The Long View, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 417 (2011) 
(discussing existing environmental taxes as a tool for protecting the environment). 
 48. I.R.C. §§ 4131–4132; see Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 59, 62 (1999) 
(describing the relationship between the vaccine excise tax and the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program). 
 49. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 127 (1973). 
 50. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167; CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, 
THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 49 (1997). 
 51. See S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 112TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF 
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 358 (Comm. Print. 2012) (Cong. 
Research Serv.) [hereinafter 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM] (“For taxpayers who can itemize, the 
home mortgage interest deduction encourages home ownership by reducing the cost of owning 
compared with renting.”).  
 52. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. 
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specifically, but merely authorized a deduction for interest payments 
of any kind.53 Congress permitted taxpayers to deduct consumer 
interest as well as business interest for administrability reasons, which 
made sense in a more agrarian era in which business and personal 
expenses were often commingled, nonfarm consumer debt was low, 
and most homeowners were not subject to the income tax in any 
event.54 Congress only began contemplating the deductibility of home 
mortgage interest as an incentive for home ownership after World 
War II, when homeownership, mortgage debt, and the reach of the 
income tax had all expanded.55 In 1986 and 1987, Congress revamped 
the interest deduction—denying a deduction for consumer interest 
generally, but authorizing a specific deduction for most home 
mortgage interest to promote homeownership.56 In short, a deduction 
that was once relatively value neutral is now perceived as merely an 
indirect financial subsidy to mostly middle-class homeowners and the 
real estate industry. 
Although the tax system has always served multiple goals, recent 
decades have seen a dramatic escalation in tax programs and 
provisions serving purposes other than traditional revenue raising. 
First and foremost, Congress has dramatically expanded its use of tax 
expenditures—various exclusions, deductions, credits, deferrals, and 
preferences that, by definition, represent the exact opposite of 
revenue raising.57 Not long after Stanley Surrey coined the tax 
 
 53. See id. § II(B), 38 Stat. at 167; see also HOWARD, supra note 50, at 53–54 (“Included in 
these expenses was interest paid on all indebtedness, including but not limited to home 
mortgages.”); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the 
Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 240–44 (2010) (discussing 
the history of home mortgage interest deductions in the early internal revenue laws).  
 54. See HOWARD, supra note 50, at 53–54; Ventry, supra note 53, at 241–42.  
 55. See Ventry, supra note 53, at 252–59 (recounting 1950s criticism of the deduction for 
home mortgage interest as well as Congress’s continued support for using the tax code to 
promote home ownership). 
 56. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2246–48 (1986) (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 163(h)(1)–(3) (2012)); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 
No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330–85 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 163(h)(1)–(3)); see also 
Ventry, supra note 53, at 274–76 (discussing how qualified residence interest was designed to 
boost homeownership). 
 57. See 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 51, at 1031–35 (documenting types of tax 
expenditures). A daunting array of articles addresses the topic of tax expenditures, including but 
not limited to debate over the precise definition of the concept. For one helpful summary of the 
scholarly discussion of tax expenditures, including disagreement over the definition, see Eric T. 
Laity, The Corporation as Administrative Agency: Tax Expenditures and Institutional Design, 28 
VA. TAX REV. 411, 421–29 (2008). For an explanation of the methodology used by the Joint 
Committee on Taxation for compiling its list of federal tax expenditures and noting areas of 
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expenditures term in the 1960s,58 the federal tax expenditure budget 
listed sixty items totaling somewhere between $60 billion and $65 
billion.59 By comparison, the most recent biennial compendium of tax 
expenditures prepared by the Congressional Research Service lists 
two hundred and fifty such items totaling well over $1 trillion,60 and 
even that extensive list does not purport to be comprehensive.61 Some 
tax expenditures are small and, sometimes, short-lived, like recent 
credits for first-time homebuyers and purchasers of electric vehicles.62 
Others are large, longstanding, and complicated—like the exclusions 
for employer contributions for employee health coverage and 
retirement plans, or the aforementioned deduction for home 
mortgage interest.63 
What may be underappreciated, however, is the extent to which 
tax expenditures require the IRS to serve programs, purposes, and 
functions that look less like traditional revenue collection and more 
like the regulatory and social welfare programs of other, nontax 
agencies.64 Congress increasingly utilizes refundable tax credits rather 
than direct subsidies to alleviate poverty and support working 
 
disagreement, see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL 
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2011–2015, 3–10 (Comm. Print 2012).  
 58. See SURREY, supra note 49, at vii (describing Surrey’s introduction of the term in a 
1967 speech and his development of the tax expenditure budget in 1968 as Assistant Secretary 
for Tax Policy in the Treasury Department). 
 59. Id. at 7–11. 
 60. 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 51, at 1, 11. 
 61. The Compendium draws its data from tax expenditure estimates compiled by the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (JCT). Id. at 1. The JCT, in turn, acknowledges that it does not include 
de minimis items that fall below $50 million or items for which quantification is unavailable. 
STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 57, at 27–30. 
 62. The tax expenditure estimates compiled by the JCT in 2012 documented more than 
thirty items valued at less than $50 million each. See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 
supra note 57, at 27–28. The same report included seventy-six tax expenditure items that expired 
in 2010 and 2011, including, for example, the I.R.C. § 36 first-time homebuyer credit of 
(available for homes purchased between April 9, 2008, and May 1, 2010) and the I.R.C. § 30 
credit for purchasing a plug-in electric vehicle (available for vehicles purchased between 
February 18, 2009, and December 31, 2011). See id. at 28. 
 63. According to the 2012 Congressional Research Service compendium, the amounts in 
2011 for these three expenditures, respectively, were $109.3 billion, $105.3 billion, and $77.6 
billion. 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 51, at 5. 
 64. See Susannah Camic Tahk, Everything Is Tax: Evaluating the Structural Transformation 
of U.S. Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 67 (2013) (“For the past twenty-five years, 
Congress has been relying increasingly on the tax code to accomplish goals beyond raising 
revenue.”). 
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families.65 Amounts expended by the government on the earned 
income tax credit (EITC) and the child tax credit each surpassed 
those for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and its 
predecessor, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, years ago.66 In 
other words, the IRS is now one of the government’s principal 
welfare agencies, on par with the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) and the Social Security Administration.67 Other 
scholars have documented some of the administrative challenges 
posed by this arrangement, as the tax system’s traditional revenue-
raising orientation clashes with the objectives of the refundable 
credits.68 
Anecdotally, Treasury and IRS officials bemoan the amount of 
time they spend implementing the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA). Enacted in 2010,69 the ACA is a complicated and 
massive piece of legislation that endeavors to expand health 
insurance coverage and control health care costs through various 
mandates, regulations, and subsidies administered by a combination 
of federal and state agencies.70 The ACA contains several revenue-
raising components, including new excise taxes on indoor tanning 
services71 and medical devices,72 a new insurance policy “fee,”73 and an 
 
 65. See Lipman, supra note 31, at 1180–84 (describing the history of the EITC as a 
mechanism for alleviating poverty); EITC & Other Refundable Credits, IRS, http://www.eitc.irs.
gov (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (highlighting and facilitating claims to the EITC and other 
refundable tax credits). See generally David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of 
Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 956 (2004) (discussing Congress’s integration of 
spending programs into the I.R.C., comparing the EITC and food stamp programs); Lawrence 
Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. 
REV. 1867 (2005) (comparing and contrasting the EITC, Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families, and food stamps). 
 66. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 
TO CONGRESS: VOLUME TWO: RESEARCH AND RELATED STUDIES 78 (2009), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/09_tas_arc_vol_2.pdf. 
 67. Lipman, supra note 31, at 1173. 
 68. See generally Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Those Who Know, Those Who Don’t, and Those 
Who Know Better: Balancing Complexity, Sophistication, and Accuracy on Tax Returns, 11 PITT. 
TAX REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2338161; Lipman supra note 31, at 1184–98. But see Zelenak, supra note 65, at 1915 (arguing 
that the tax system is better at administering welfare programs than other agencies). 
 69. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 70. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) (noting the 
ACA’s goals and size). 
 71. I.R.C. § 5000B (2012). 
 72. Id. § 4191. 
 73. Id. § 4375. 
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expanded Medicare tax.74 The ACA’s infamous individual mandate 
may also yield some revenue, but the I.R.C. and ACA label the 
mandate a “shared responsibility payment” and a “penalty” rather 
than a tax.75 Regardless, the core aims of the ACA are health care 
access and cost controls, not raising revenue, and the roles that 
Treasury and IRS officials play in ACA implementation extend far 
beyond the legislation’s revenue-raising components.76 Since the 
ACA’s enactment, Treasury and the IRS have worked with HHS and 
the Department of Labor (Labor) to draft regulations that, among 
other things, accommodate religious organizations that object to 
mandatory contraceptive coverage;77 elaborate the extent to which 
group health plans are precluded from denying coverage to 
individuals with preexisting health conditions;78 and identify ways in 
which health insurance providers may or may not offer incentives for 
participating in wellness programs.79 The ACA’s medical loss ratio 
provisions, its requirement that health insurers accept all eligible 
applicants irrespective of preexisting conditions, and its standards for 
coverage and pricing—all of which Treasury and the IRS are involved 
in implementing—essentially convert health insurance companies into 
public utilities, much like providers of telecommunications services 
(regulated by the Federal Communications Commission) or 
electricity transmission services (regulated by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission).80 In short, in the context of implementing 
 
 74. Id. § 1401(b). 
 75. Id. § 5000A; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2582–84, 2600 (holding that 
the individual mandate is not a tax for purposes of I.R.C. § 7421(a), even though the mandate is 
constitutional as an exercise of Congress’s power to lay and collect taxes). 
 76. For a list of ACA tax provisions and discussion of Treasury and IRS responsibilities 
with respect to the ACA, see Affordable Care Act Tax Provisions, IRS, 
www.irs.gov/uac/Affordable-Care-Act-Tax-Provisions (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 77. Group Health Plans and Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services 
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (T.D. 
9578) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
 78. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Preexisting Condition Exclusions, 
Lifetime and Annual Limits, Rescissions, and Patient Protections, T.D. 9491, 2010-32 I.R.B. 186, 
188–89. 
 79. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs 
in Group Health Plans, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,620 (Nov. 26, 2012) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. pt. 54, 
29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pts. 146, 147). 
 80. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 668–
71 (2013) (making this comparison); Richard A. Epstein & Paula M. Stannard, Constitutional 
Ratemaking and the Affordable Care Act: A New Source of Vulnerability, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 
243, 261–67 (2012) (comparing and contrasting the constitutional posture of health insurers 
under the ACA with that of public utilities); Sara Rosenbaum, Realigning the Social Order: The 
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the ACA, at least, Treasury and the IRS seem indistinguishable from 
other, more traditional regulatory agencies. 
Although the ACA has expanded and brought renewed 
attention to Treasury and IRS involvement in the health care sector, 
those agencies’ participation in administering health and welfare 
programs is not new. Long before Congress enacted the ACA, it 
assigned Treasury and the IRS a leading role in administering health 
care as well as pension benefits governed by the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).81 Congress 
enacted ERISA to protect participants in certain employee pension 
and welfare plans, including health coverage plans, by imposing 
various participation, vesting, funding, reporting, and disclosure 
requirements on the employers and unions that sponsor them.82 The 
role of Treasury and the IRS in administering the pension aspects of 
ERISA largely corresponds to provisions in the I.R.C. that exclude 
qualifying pension contributions and earnings from taxable 
income83—acknowledged tax expenditure items.84 By contrast, 
Treasury and IRS responsibilities for administering ERISA health 
coverage requirements (as opposed to ACA health coverage 
requirements) relate most closely to a financial penalty, styled as an 
excise tax, imposed by the I.R.C. on nonconforming group health 
 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the U.S. Health Insurance System, 7 J. HEALTH 
& BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 25 (2011) (describing the ACA as adopting “a public utility approach”). 
 81. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 82. See STEVEN J. SACHER, JAMES I. SINGER & TERESA M. CONNERTON, EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS LAW 22–35 (2d ed. 2000) (describing ERISA’s purposes and coverage); Anne Tucker, 
Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 
153, 163–66 (2013) (same). Although historical accounts of ERISA focus primarily on pension 
reform, Congress drafted ERISA to cover a broader array of employee welfare plans, including 
employer-sponsored health insurance plans. See SACHER ET AL., supra, at 28 (including 
insurance coverage among list of welfare plans covered by ERISA).  
 83. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 401–407, 410–418E, 457 (2012). Many of these provisions have parallel 
provisions in ERISA, and Treasury claims interpretive jurisdiction over both. See COLLEEN E. 
MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 95–96 (3d ed. 2011) (listing I.R.C. 
provisions and corollary ERISA provisions); see also Mortality Tables for Determining Present 
Value, T.D. 9419, 2008-40 I.R.B. 790, 791 n.1 (asserting jurisdiction to adopt morality tables for 
determining present value and making other computations for purposes of applying pension 
funding requirements under I.R.C. §§ 412 and 430 as well as ERISA § 302); Diversification 
Requirements for Certain Defined Contribution Plans, T.D. 9484, 2010-24 I.R.B. 748, 748–49 
(adopting regulations concerning diversification requirements for defined contribution plans 
holding publicly traded employer securities under both I.R.C. § 401(a)(35) and parallel 
provision 29 U.S.C. § 204(j)).  
 84. 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 57, at 963. 
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plans.85 Regardless, as with the ACA, Treasury and IRS 
administrative efforts in the ERISA area have virtually nothing to do 
with raising revenue. Instead, Treasury and the IRS have worked in 
recent years, again with HHS and Labor, to adopt regulations 
concerning the length of hospital stays for new mothers and their 
newborn infants86 and ensuring that the mental health and substance 
abuse disorder benefits provided by group health plans enjoy parity 
with those plans’ medical and surgical benefits.87 
The exempt organization sector represents yet another area in 
which Treasury and IRS regulation has expanded far beyond the 
revenue-raising function. Charities have been exempt from the 
corporate income tax from its origin in 1913,88 and Congress 
authorized the deduction for individual contributions to eligible 
charities not long after that.89 Exempt organizations with certain types 
of income now pay an unrelated business income tax.90 Neither the 
exemption from the corporate income tax, nor the deduction for 
charitable contributions, however, contributes to revenue raising in 
any way; rather, both are means by which the federal government 
indirectly subsidizes exempt organizations.91 In the century since 
 
 85. Specifically, for any group health plan that fails to meet the requirements of I.R.C. 
chapter 100, I.R.C. § 4980D imposes an excise tax upon a sponsoring employer of one hundred 
dollars per day, per individual affected. I.R.C. § 4980D. Chapter 100, in turn, imposes an array 
of portability, access, and renewability requirements, as well as benefit requirements for 
mothers and newborns and for mental health, among other things. I.R.C. §§ 9801–9802, 9811–
9812 (imposing group health plan requirements); see also MEDILL, supra note 83, at 354–55 
(discussing the “excise tax penalty” adopted to enforce group health plan requirements). 
 86. Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Under the 
Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act, T.D. 9427, 2008-47 I.R.B. 1179, 1181. 
 87. Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, T.D. 9479, 2010-18 I.R.B. 618, 622–26. 
 88. The Revenue Act of 1913, which established the modern income tax, exempted 
charities from the levy imposed on corporate earnings. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 
§ II.G(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (exempting, inter alia, “any corporation or association organized and 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes”). 
 89. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a)(11), 42 Stat. 227, 241. 
 90. I.R.C. §§ 511–514 (2012); FRANCIS R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF 
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS ¶ 21.01 (2002) (describing the unrelated business income tax). For 
documentation of the IRS collection of $496 million in unrelated business income tax in fiscal 
year 2012, see Figure 1. 
 91. See e.g., 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 57, at 5 (identifying charitable 
contribution deduction as a tax expenditure item); Daniel Halpern, Is Income Tax Exemption 
for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283, 311–12 (2011) (concluding that both exempt status 
and the charitable contribution deduction are subsidies for exempt organizations). But see Boris 
I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Corporations from Federal 
Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 304 (1976) (concluding that early legislative perceptions 
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Congress first exempted charitable organizations from the corporate 
income tax, the nonprofit sector has expanded dramatically in both 
size and complexity.92 Current Treasury and IRS administration 
efforts in this one area now involve an entire IRS division (out of only 
four) monitoring more than 1.6 million tax exempt organizations93 
across a few dozen separate statutory classifications that encompass 
universities with billion-dollar endowments and tiny religious schools 
teaching a few dozen students in a small town; large hospitals and 
small, free health clinics; labor unions; chambers of commerce; the 
National Football League; churches, big and small; the Metropolitan 
Opera and tiny, rural theater companies; the local Elks Lodge; and 
your Aunt Sadie’s garden club.94 Defining which organizations are 
eligible for exempt status and, separately, which may receive tax 
deductible contributions is complicated.95 Evaluating applications for 
exempt status and monitoring existing organizations for continued 
compliance with eligibility requirements are even more difficult. Tax 
administrators in this sector routinely make decisions implicating 
issues as varied as free speech, politics, and religion;96 election law and 
 
“that nonprofit organizations are not suitable targets for an income tax . . . was a sound 
judgment deserving more attention and respect than it has received from tax scholars”).  
 92. HILL & MANCINO, supra note 90, ¶ 1.01; James J. Fishman, The Nonprofit Sector: 
Myths and Realities, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 303, 303–04 (2006). 
 93. See At-a-Glance: IRS Divisions and Principal Offices, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/At-a-
Glance:-IRS-Divisions-and-Principal-Offices (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (listing four primary 
IRS divisions: Wage and Investment; Large Business and International; Small Business/Self-
Employed; and Tax-Exempt and Government Entities); Tax Exempt & Government Entities 
Division at a Glance, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Exempt-&-Government-Entities-
Division-At-a-Glance (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (describing the work of the TE/GE division 
and noting “this sector is not designed to generate revenue, but rather to ensure that the entities 
fulfill the policy goals that their tax exemption was designed to achieve”). 
 94. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(1)–(29), (d)–(f) (describing different exempt organization types); see 
also Charles A. Borek, Decoupling Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations, 31 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 183, 201–07 (2004) (describing a spectrum of exempt organizations); 
Fishman, supra note 92, at 303–05 (same).  
 95. Only some exempt organizations can receive tax deductible contributions. Compare 
I.R.C. § 501 (listing types of exempt organizations), with id. § 170(c) (listing organizations 
eligible to receive deductible contributions). 
 96. See generally Johnny Rex Buckles, Does the Constitutional Norm of Separation of 
Church and State Justify the Denial of Tax Exemption to Churches that Engage in Partisan 
Political Speech?, 84 IND. L.J. 447 (2009); Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, 
and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771 (2001); Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and 
Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the Political Activities of Religious 
Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875 (2001).  
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campaign finance;97 and, again, health policy and hospital 
governance.98 For a prime example of the difficulties Treasury and the 
IRS face in assessing an organization’s exempt status, one need look 
no further than recent regulations, proposed in the wake of the IRS–
Tea Party scandal, attempting to identify for I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) social 
welfare organizations exactly which activities are candidate-related 
political activities.99 
Speaking of politics and campaigns, how many tax experts realize 
that the I.R.C. has an entire subtitle dedicated to the financing of 
presidential election campaigns? Tax experts who prepare their own 
or others’ individual income tax returns will no doubt recall the box 
on the Form 1040 asking taxpayers whether they want three dollars 
from some unidentified source to fund presidential election 
campaigns.100 I.R.C. § 6096 authorizes individual taxpayers to allocate 
three dollars of federal funds to the Presidential Election Campaign 
Fund.101 Subchapter H, in turn, governs eligibility to receive the funds, 
authorizes audits of campaign expenses, requires reports to Congress, 
and penalizes noncompliance.102 The Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) is primarily responsible for administering Subchapter H,103 but 
 
 97. Demonstrating the issues that the IRS faces in this area, in 2011, the Election Law 
Journal published an entire volume on this topic. For just a few of the contributions to that 
volume, see, for example, Richard Briffault, Nonprofits and Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens 
United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 337 (2011); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying: 
Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 407 (2011); Donald B. 
Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory 
Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427 (2011). 
 98. See, e.g., Jessica Berg, Putting the Community Back into the “Community Benefit” 
Standard, 44 GA. L. REV. 375, 377 (2010) (discussing IRS-developed “community benefit” 
criteria that nonprofit hospitals must satisfy to maintain exempt status). 
 99. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare 
Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535 (Nov. 29, 2013) (to 
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). For comprehensive coverage of the IRS–Tea Party scandal 
through April 5, 2014, including but not limited to reaction to the proposed regulations, see Paul 
Caron, The IRS Scandal, Day 331, TAXPROF BLOG (Apr. 5, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.
com/taxprof_blog/2014/04/the-irs-scandal-5.html. 
 100. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREAS., FORM 1040 (2013), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf (offering opportunity to authorize contributions in the 
upper right-hand corner of the first page). 
 101. I.R.C. § 6096; see also Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 
89-809, § 302(a), 80 Stat. 1587–90 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6096 (2012)) (establishing the 
fund). 
 102. I.R.C. §§ 9001–9042. 
 103. See id. § 9009(b) (authorizing the FEC to promulgate regulations “as it deems 
necessary to carry out the functions and duties imposed on it by” chapter 95, consisting of 
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Treasury and the IRS play secondary roles that require coordination 
and cooperation with the FEC and, occasionally, regulations to 
govern those administrative efforts.104 Again, however, Subchapter H 
serves no revenue-raising function whatsoever. 
II.  EMPIRICAL STUDY 
None of these observations about the contemporary U.S. tax 
system’s scope are especially novel. All are well recognized within the 
tax policy literature. Nevertheless, my own informal impression is 
that many tax experts view the administrative burdens of these 
additional programs, purposes, and functions as small and tangential 
relative to the revenue-raising function. Although this may be true 
provision by provision or program by program, when considered 
collectively, these non-revenue-raising items add up. My goal with 
this project is to obtain at least a preliminary sense of the extent to 
which contemporary tax administration is dedicated to social welfare 
and regulatory programs, purposes, and functions, rather than more 
traditional revenue raising. To achieve this goal, the Article evaluates 
Treasury regulations—proposed, temporary, and final—promulgated 
during the five-year period between January 1, 2008, and December 
31, 2012. 
A. Why Study Treasury Regulations? 
If the goal is to evaluate the full picture of tax administration, 
studying Treasury regulations alone may seem like a rather limited 
place to start. Several government agencies and offices are 
responsible for administering different aspects of the U.S. tax system. 
Although the Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy and the IRS Chief 
Counsel’s Office work closely in promulgating regulations, they 
represent separate agencies that perform different administrative 
functions.105 Treasury’s regulatory preferences and priorities may not 
 
§§ 9001–9013); id. § 9039(b) (authorizing the FEC to adopt regulations “which it determines to 
be necessary to carry out its responsibilities under” chapter 96, consisting of §§ 9031–9042). 
 104. Treas. Reg. § 702.9006-1 (2008); Treas. Reg. § 702.9037-1 (2008); Treas. Reg. 
§ 702.9037-2 (2008).  
 105. The Internal Revenue Manual discusses this relationship. IRM 32.1.1.3, 32.1.1.3.1, 
32.1.1.4.4, 32.1.1.4.5 (Sept. 23, 2011) (discussing involvement of Office of Chief Counsel and 
Office of Tax Policy personnel in regulation projects); see LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN 
W. MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES § 1.03 (3d ed. 2008) (comparing Treasury and IRS 
involvement in regulation drafting); MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE & PROCEDURE ¶ 
1.02 (1991) (describing the Treasury and IRS roles in the tax system). 
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always align precisely with those of the IRS or the Department of 
Justice Tax Division, which also plays a prominent role in tax 
enforcement.106 Moreover, the Chief Counsel’s Office is only one part 
of a much larger IRS bureaucracy with many offices and divisions 
pursuing a wide range of processing, enforcement, educational, and 
other administrative tasks.107 
Nevertheless, studying Treasury regulations is a worthwhile first 
step. Among the various documents published by Treasury and the 
IRS in administering the tax system, Treasury regulations are the 
most authoritative.108 Treasury often undertakes regulation projects in 
response to recent legislation.109 Congress has tended in recent years 
to ask the tax system to do more rather than less, and that trend 
shows no sign of abating.110 Therefore, although this study does not 
aim to be predictive in any way, determining the extent to which 
Treasury regulation projects over the past five years arguably pursued 
ends other than raising revenue may give us some idea of what we 
might expect from future Treasury and IRS regulatory agendas. 
 
 106. GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAUGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX 
CONTROVERSIES ¶ 1.09 (describing different functions of IRS and Department of Justice 
attorneys in tax cases). 
 107. SALTZMAN, supra note 105, ¶ 1.02. 
 108. See, e.g., Mitchell Rogovin & Donald Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, 
Rulings, Reliance, and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View from Within, TAXES, Aug. 2009, 
at 21, 22 (describing Treasury regulations as “the primary source for guidance as to the IRS’s 
position regarding the interpretation of the [I.R.C.],” and discussing their legal weight). 
 109. This proposition should be self-evident. For example, as discussed in Part I above and 
documented in Part II.C below, a substantial percentage of Treasury regulation projects 
undertaken and documents published in the past five years have concerned the ACA—a 
massive piece of legislation that nevertheless required extensive implementing regulations. 
Moreover, although the summary of study findings below does not address this topic in detail, as 
part of the larger study from which this paper derives, I have coded each regulation project 
studied for whether Treasury adopted new regulations or amended old regulations in response 
to legislation. Of the 262 regulation projects discussed as part of this paper, 118 contained some 
reference to legislation that Treasury was acting to implement. For additional examples 
supporting the proposition that Treasury promulgates regulations in response to legislation, see, 
for example, T.D. 9533, 2011-33 I.R.B. 139, 139 (acting to implement new requirements imposed 
by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act); T.D. 9464, 2009-48 
I.R.B. 692, 692 (adopting temporary regulations in response to statutory changes made by the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008); T.D. 9422, 2008-42 I.R.B. 898, 899 
(implementing changes made to rules governing S corporations by the American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004 and the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005). 
 110. See supra Part I; see also, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Former Commissioners of Internal 
Revenue in Support of Defendants-Appellants, supra note 27, at 3–7 (describing the expansion 
of congressional use of the tax system for functions other than traditional revenue raising). 
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Also, some of the express and supposed statutory exceptions 
from administrative-law norms in the tax context focus importantly 
on Treasury regulations more than other tax agency actions. As 
already noted, one example is Congress’s explicit authorization in 
I.R.C. § 7805(b) of retroactive Treasury regulations with no limitation 
for subject matter. Another is the Anti-Injunction Act, which at least 
arguably precludes pre-enforcement judicial review of Treasury 
regulations under the APA.111 In litigation, the government has 
argued in recent years that I.R.C. § 7805(e) authorizes the issuance of 
temporary Treasury regulations with only postpromulgation notice 
and comment and without a contemporaneous claim of good cause—
an approach to notice-and-comment rulemaking that is inconsistent 
with general administrative-law requirements.112 
Finally, although IRS administrative activities do not fully align 
with Treasury’s regulatory agenda, a certain symbiotic relationship 
does exist between Treasury regulations and IRS guidance and 
enforcement activity. An IRS that helps draft and must enforce new 
Treasury regulations in individual cases is likely to expend its own 
resources in interpreting and applying those regulations. Relatedly, 
IRS enforcement actions in turn prompt Treasury to promulgate new 
regulations as the need for clarification arises. Thus, while Congress 
should not rely solely on a study of Treasury regulations in 
contemplating the need for IRS organizational reform, the close 
relationship between Treasury Department and IRS activities makes 
Treasury’s regulatory emphasis at least relevant to such discussions. 
 
 111. The scope of the Anti-Injunction Act as a limitation on judicial review in the tax 
context has been the subject of recent litigation. E.g., Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc); Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-623, 2014 WL 129023 at *8–11 (D.D.C. 
Jan. 15, 2014); Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 13-529 (JEB), 2014 WL 
114519, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2014). See generally Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: 
Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking 
Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153 (2008) (discussing this issue). 
 112. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. To date, the only judicial opinion to address 
the issue—a concurring opinion by Judges Halpern and Holmes of the U.S. Tax Court—
squarely rejected the government’s interpretation of I.R.C. § 7805(e) as inconsistent with the 
plain text of that provision and as contrary to congressional intent regarding the APA. See 
Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211, 245–46 (2010) (Halpern & 
Holmes, JJ., concurring in the result), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 
vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012); see also Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 
VAND. L. REV. 465, 496–99 (2013) (discussing this issue at greater length). 
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B. Methodology 
Like most agencies, Treasury and the IRS promulgate 
regulations using notice-and-comment rulemaking.113 For virtually all 
Treasury regulation projects, Treasury and the IRS will publish a 
notice of proposed rulemaking (NOPR) with background, 
explanation, and proposed regulatory text.114 After affording 
interested members of the public an opportunity to submit comments 
regarding the proposed regulations, Treasury and the IRS will publish 
a Treasury Decision (TD) containing final regulations along with 
further background and explanation.115 In many instances, Treasury 
and the IRS publish a TD with legally binding temporary regulations 
simultaneously with the NOPR and then replace or withdraw the 
temporary regulations with the TD that contains the final 
regulations.116 This Article evaluates Treasury regulation activity by 
considering major rulemaking documents—mostly, but not 
exclusively, TDs and NOPRs—published between January 1, 2008, 
and December 31, 2012.117 
 
 113. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(d) (2012) (describing notice-and-comment rulemaking 
procedures generally); IRM 32.1.2.3(3) (Sept. 23, 2011) (describing the process of referencing 
the APA and asserting that “the IRS usually publishes its [Notices of Proposed Rulemaking] in 
the Federal Register and solicits public comments”). 
 114. IRM 32.1.1.2.2 (Sept. 23, 2011) (describing IRS NOPRs). Occasionally, Treasury 
publishes a TD containing final regulations without first publishing a NOPR. See, e.g., T.D. 
9586, 2012-22 I.R.B. 960, 960 (withdrawing existing final regulations without first publishing a 
NOPR after Congress repealed the associated I.R.C. provision). 
 115. IRM 32.1.1.4, 32.1.1.5 (Sept. 23, 2011) (describing TDs and the process of issuing final 
regulations). 
 116. Id. 32.1.1.3 (Sept. 23, 2011) (describing IRS use of temporary regulations). Whether 
Treasury and IRS use of temporary regulations complies with the APA’s notice-and-comment 
rulemaking requirements is an open and debated question. See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 112, 
at 492–502 (detailing the controversy). 
 117. For many regulations, Treasury and the IRS also publish one or more minor 
documents—for example, to schedule or cancel public hearings, or to correct typographical 
errors in TDs or NOPRs. See, e.g., Fees on Health Insurance Policies and Self-Insured Plans for 
the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund; Hearing Cancellation, 77 Fed. Reg. 
47,573 (Aug. 9, 2012) (canceling a previously scheduled public hearing); Health Insurance 
Premium Tax Credit; Correction, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,048 (July 12, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 
pt. 1) (documenting corrections to regulatory preamble contained in T.D. 9590). These 
documents tend to be brief and routinized, but they generally are not published in the Internal 
Revenue Bulletin and can be easy to miss in the Federal Register. Sometimes Treasury will 
publish two separate documents with individual correcting amendments in the same edition of 
the Federal Register. On other occasions, Treasury will combine several correcting amendments 
in the same Federal Register document. Some minor notices address more than one project. In 
sum, including these minor technical documents in the study would have been more distortive 
than meaningful.  
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1. Identifying the Documents.  Treasury and the IRS typically 
publish TDs and NOPRs in both the Federal Register and the 
Internal Revenue Bulletin. Consequently, major rulemaking 
documents were identified in three ways. First, I looked at the 
documents listed in the “Highlights of This Issue” and “Finding List 
of Current Actions on Previously Published Items” sections of each 
issue of the Internal Revenue Bulletin during the relevant time 
period. Second, because TDs are numbered sequentially, I 
ascertained which were published in the Federal Register during the 
relevant time period. Finally, to be certain that I had identified all of 
the relevant documents, I searched in Westlaw’s Federal Register 
database for the Regulation Identifier Number (RIN) and Counsel 
Automated Systems Environment Management Information System 
(CASE-MIS) number assigned to each of those documents already 
located.118 
During the five years under study, Treasury and the IRS 
published 449 major rulemaking documents in the Federal Register 
or the Internal Revenue Bulletin: 241 TDs,119 199 NOPRs,120 and 8 
additional, highly substantive documents labeled as an advanced 
NOPR,121 a request for information,122 or a solicitation of comments.123 
 
 118. For further discussion of RIN and CASE-MIS numbers, see Appendix 1.  
 119. Although Treasury and the IRS typically publish all TDs in both the Federal Register 
and the Internal Revenue Bulletin, publication in the Internal Revenue Bulletin typically occurs 
some weeks after publication in the Federal Register. Consequently, the study includes several 
TDs published in the Federal Register but not the Internal Revenue Bulletin during the study 
period, and vice versa. The study also includes one TD that was published in the Federal 
Register but was never published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. For further details, see 
Appendix 2.  
 120. Although Treasury and the IRS typically publish all NOPRs in both the Federal 
Register and the Internal Revenue Bulletin, publication in the Internal Revenue Bulletin 
typically occurs some weeks after publication in the Federal Register. Consequently, the study 
includes several NOPRs published in the Federal Register but not the Internal Revenue 
Bulletin during the study period, and vice versa. The study also includes one NOPR that was 
published in the Federal Register but was never published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. For 
further details, see Appendix 2. 
 121. Treasury and the IRS do not often publish advanced NOPRs. Typically, the IRS uses 
revenue procedures or notices published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin but not in the Federal 
Register to notify taxpayers that it is contemplating a regulation project and to seek public 
comment regarding preliminary thinking about conceptual aspects. Nevertheless, in the time 
period covered by the study, Treasury published three advanced NOPRs in the Federal Register 
that were sufficiently substantive to warrant inclusion in the study. One described preliminary 
proposals for regulating the marketing by tax return preparers of tax refund anticipation loans 
and other similar products. See generally Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Guidance 
Regarding Marketing of Refund Application Loans (RALs) and Certain Other Products in 
Connection with the Preparation of a Tax Return, 73 Fed. Reg. 1131 (Jan. 7, 2008) (to be 
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Having identified these 449 documents, I then categorized them by 
subject matter and recorded other data for each as follows. 
2. Subject Matter Categories.  Although it is easy to recognize that 
the tax code serves multiple goals, it is impossible to code 
meaningfully the full panoply of I.R.C. provisions and Treasury 
 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301). Another requested comments in response to six questions 
concerning potential modifications to the new markets credit program of I.R.C. § 45D and was 
published contemporaneously with a NOPR containing proposed regulations implementing that 
same provision. See generally Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, New Markets Tax 
Credit Non-Real Estate Investments, 76 Fed. Reg. 32,882 (June 7, 2011) (to be codified at 26 
C.F.R. pt. 1). The third advanced NOPR posed questions and offered preliminary proposals and 
alternatives to address religious objections to contraceptive coverage under the ACA. See 
generally Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Certain Preventive Services Under the 
Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 
C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
 122. Treasury published four requests for information in the five-year time period covered 
by the study. See Medical Loss Ratios; Request for Comments Regarding Section 2718 of the 
Public Health Service Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,297 (Apr. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 
54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146, 148); Request for Information Regarding Lifetime 
Income Options for Participants and Beneficiaries in Retirement Plans, 75 Fed. Reg. 5253 (Feb. 
2, 2010); Request for Information Regarding the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental 
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 74 Fed. Reg. 19,155 (Apr. 28, 2009); Request 
for Information Regarding Sections 101 Through 104 of the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,208 (Oct. 10, 2008). Each of these documents 
announced Treasury’s intention to embark upon a regulation project, described the issues to be 
addressed by the project, and posed various questions with respect to which Treasury was 
seeking public comment. For example, one request for information contained a list of thirty-
nine questions aimed at helping Treasury and Labor to evaluate “what steps, if any, they could 
or should take, by regulation or otherwise, to enhance the retirement security of participants in 
employer-sponsored retirement plans and IRAs by facilitating access to, and use of, lifetime 
income or other arrangements designed to provide a stream of lifetime income after 
retirement.” Request for Information Regarding Lifetime Income Options for Participants and 
Beneficiaries in Retirement Plans, 75 Fed. Reg. 5253, 5255 (Feb. 2, 2010). Building upon the 
answers to these questions, Treasury subsequently issued proposed regulations governing 
longevity annuity contracts purchased under tax-qualified defined contribution plans. Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Public Hearing, Longevity Annuity Contracts, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 5443 (proposed Feb. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 123. On August 22, 2011, Treasury, HHS, and Labor together published proposed standards 
for benefit and coverage summaries and glossaries provided by health insurance providers to 
their customers pursuant to the ACA. Summary of Benefits and Coverage and the Uniform 
Glossary, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,442 (proposed Aug. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 54, 602, 
29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). On the same day, these same agencies published a 
separate document containing and seeking comments regarding proposed templates for a 
summary of benefits and coverage and a uniform glossary that would comply with the proposed 
regulations. See Summary of Benefits and Coverage and Uniform Glossary-Templates, 
Instructions, and Related Materials Under the Public Health Service Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,475 
(proposed Aug. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. 
pt.147). Although not labeled a TD or NOPR, this accompanying document, which exceeded 
fifty pages in length, seemed sufficiently substantive to be included in this study.  
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regulations as serving an exclusively revenue raising, social welfare, 
or regulatory purpose. As outlined in Part I, individual tax code 
provisions and programs, together with their related regulations, 
often reflect two or even all three of these emphases at once. 
Nevertheless, categories of tax provisions are readily identifiable as 
being more or less heavily oriented toward non-revenue-raising 
functions. As discussed in Part I, tax expenditures are obvious. One 
might quibble over whether a particular tax expenditure item serves 
social welfare purposes or regulatory purposes (or both 
simultaneously), but tax expenditures cannot be said to raise revenue 
for the government. Regulations implementing the ACA and ERISA, 
governing the exempt organization sector, or administering the 
Presidential Election Campaign Fund are likewise heavily weighted, 
if not completely oriented, toward purposes and functions other than 
revenue raising. By contrast, given that Social Security and Medicare 
taxes represent the second largest source of government revenue and 
remain substantially free of tax expenditures, regulations concerning 
these taxes are perhaps the most heavily weighted toward the 
revenue-raising function. Given the mixed justifications for the 
corporate income tax, the estate tax, and various non-ACA excise 
taxes, regulations concerning these taxes arguably fall somewhere in 
the middle. 
Accordingly, I coded each document according to a list of subject 
matter categories that offer at least some sense of the extent to which 
Treasury’s regulatory efforts are focused on purposes other than 
revenue raising. The categories are as follows: 
 
• Tax expenditures 
• Affordable Care Act 
• ERISA 
• Exempt organizations 
• Corporate/international that is primarily corporate 
• Individual/not obviously corporate 
• Gifts, trusts, and estates 
• Partnerships and other non-T&E pass through 
• Employment taxes 
• Non-ACA excise taxes 
• Campaign finance 
• Administration and procedure 
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Most or all of these categories should be familiar and unobjectionable 
to tax experts. For the most part, the listed categories are drawn 
directly from large and specifically identifiable programs 
administered by the IRS; from I.R.C. subtitles, chapters, and 
subchapters; and from government documents reporting taxes 
collected and returns filed.124 The campaign finance category 
corresponds to Subtitle H provisions concerning the financing of 
presidential election campaigns.125 Nevertheless, a few additional 
points of explanation regarding the subject matter categories may be 
helpful in assessing the study’s findings. 
First, to add objectivity given differences of opinion among tax 
experts concerning the definition of tax expenditures, the study relied 
on the 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 biennial compendia prepared by the 
Congressional Research Service in assigning documents to the tax 
expenditures category.126 In other words, if a document implemented 
a tax provision discussed by one of the biennial compendia, then the 
document was coded as belonging to the tax expenditure category. 
Even if some might argue that a particular tax provision does not 
really represent a tax expenditure, so long as one of the biennial 
compendia discussed the provision, then a document interpreting that 
provision was coded as belonging to the tax expenditures category. 
Correspondingly, even if some might consider a particular tax 
provision to represent a tax expenditure item, if none of the biennial 
compendia discussed the provision, then a document implementing 
the provision was not coded as belonging to the tax expenditure 
category. 
That said, some provisions in the I.R.C. that were not cited by 
one of the biennial compendia nevertheless exist solely to elaborate 
the parameters of tax expenditure items. For example, the various 
compendia list I.R.C. §§ 401–407, 410–418E, and 457, but not I.R.C. 
§ 430, as providing an exclusion from an individual’s income for 
 
 124. E.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 33, at 3 tbl.1.  
 125. I.R.C. §§ 9001–9042 (2012). For further discussion of Subchapter H, see supra notes 
102–04 and accompanying text. 
 126. 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 51; S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 111TH CONG., 
TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL 
PROVISIONS (Comm. Print 2010) (Cong. Research Serv.); S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 110TH 
CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL 
PROVISIONS (Comm. Print 2008) (Cong. Research Serv.); S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 109TH 
CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL 
PROVISIONS (Comm. Print 2006) (Cong. Research Serv.). 
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certain employer contributions to employee pension plans.127 I.R.C. § 
430 imposes funding requirements for some qualifying plans and 
defines a term contained in I.R.C. § 412—one of the listed 
provisions—which also imposes funding requirements for qualifying 
plans.128 In short, for some taxpayers, the exclusion will only be 
available if their employers comply with I.R.C. § 430. Accordingly, 
documents promulgating regulations that interpret I.R.C. § 430 were 
coded as belonging to the tax expenditures category, even though 
I.R.C. § 430 itself was not listed in any of the biennial compendia. 
Second, I assigned each document to a single subject matter 
category. Yet, perhaps inevitably, the categories sometimes overlap in 
ways that cause a degree of subjectivity in coding certain documents. 
For example, Treasury’s administrative responsibilities under ERISA 
overlap considerably with the tax expenditure excluding employer 
contributions to employee pension plans from an employee’s income. 
Indeed, many TDs and NOPRs interpreting the I.R.C. provisions 
relevant to that tax expenditure also mention ERISA. In some 
instances, Treasury and the IRS note explicitly that relevant 
provisions in the I.R.C. and ERISA are parallel and that Treasury has 
interpretative jurisdiction over both. I coded such documents based 
on my assessment of their dominant concern. 
Also, some ACA provisions modify ERISA, so several of the 
documents written to implement the ACA mention ERISA as well. 
Also, the ACA imposes excise taxes—for example, on medical 
devices and indoor tanning services. Still other ACA provisions raise 
revenue but under some other label like “fee” or “penalty.”129 
Whatever the label, the ACA’s revenue-raising provisions are often 
inextricably intertwined with other aspects of the legislation. 
Accordingly, rather than try to code ACA-related documents as 
separate subcategories, I gave the ACA its own category and coded 
all documents that claimed to implement provisions of the ACA as 
such. 
Lastly, most documents that fall in the administration and 
procedure category implicate tax professionals or taxpayers across 
several categories. Occasionally, however, Treasury and the IRS 
 
 127. E.g., 2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 51, at 963. 
 128. See I.R.C. § 430 (defining the term “minimum required contribution” including for 
purposes of I.R.C. § 412(a)(2)(A)). 
 129. For discussion of the ACA revenue-raising provisions, see supra notes 71–75 and 
accompanying text. 
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promulgate a procedural regulation that is limited to a particular 
substantive I.R.C. section. In such cases, although the regulation 
addresses procedural matters, it would not exist but for the 
substantive provision. I coded documents fitting this description as 
belonging to the relevant substantive category, rather than to the 
more general administration and procedure category. 
3. Additional Variables Coded.  While I considered each of the 
449 documents coded to be sufficiently substantive for inclusion, 
those documents were not equal in length or complexity. Several 
were more than fifty pages long, while many others were limited to a 
single page. A one-page TD or NOPR must satisfy all of the same 
procedural, circulation, and review requirements as a fifty-page TD 
or NOPR.130 In that sense, all of the documents were equal, 
irrespective of their page length. Also, page length is not a precise 
proxy for complexity or the amount of time Treasury and IRS 
personnel spent drafting a document. Nevertheless, to provide a more 
thorough basis for evaluating the 449 major rulemaking documents 
studied, and to avoid overweighting short documents and 
underweighting long ones, I recorded the page length of each in 
addition to recording its subject matter. 
Also, in addition to considering the 449 major rulemaking 
documents individually, I evaluated them on a project-by-project 
basis by grouping together those documents that are part of the same 
rulemaking project.131 Individual documents are likely better 
indicators of time dedicated to task than entire projects for two 
reasons. First, preparing each document takes time, and Treasury and 
IRS personnel must satisfy many procedural, circulation, and review 
requirements document by document. Second, although most 
regulation projects consist of one TD and one NOPR, some 
regulation projects contain three, four, or even five such documents. 
Evaluating individual documents avoids overweighting smaller 
projects and underweighting larger ones. Nevertheless, many 
procedural steps are performed project by project rather than 
document by document, and the substantive and rhetorical overlap of 
documents within a single regulation project undoubtedly offers some 
 
 130. Section 32, Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Manual offers detailed requirements for 
drafting, circulating, and reviewing regulation documents. IRM 32.1.2.1–32.1.9.5 (Sept. 23, 
2011).  
 131. For more detail on this aspect of the methodology, see Appendix 1. 
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efficiency of production.132 Consequently, assessing the documents 
project by project as well as individually offers a more thorough 
approach to measuring how Treasury and IRS personnel spend their 
time. 
Altogether, the 449 major rulemaking documents published by 
Treasury during the five years covered by the study represent 262 
individual regulation projects. Of those projects, 65 contain 
regulations that are or were only proposed. Some of the proposed 
regulations remained outstanding at the end of the study period, 
while others had been withdrawn in lieu of further action. Another 32 
projects include temporary and proposed regulations that remained 
outstanding at the end of the study period. The remaining 165 
projects were finalized during the study period. 
Just as I recorded the length of each of the 449 major rulemaking 
documents studied, I also added together the page lengths of all of 
the documents that were part of a single project. Because some 
Treasury regulation projects with documents published during the 
study period were initiated prior to that period, however, grouping 
the documents studied into projects involved pulling additional 
documents that predated the study period. Consequently, although 
the findings presented below include the subject matter breakdown of 
large Treasury regulation projects based on their total pages, the page 
totals for those projects do not correlate precisely with the tables 
evaluating individual documents. 
C. Results 
The following figures present the study results in different ways. 
First, the figures report the results of the document, project, and page 
counts for each subject matter category individually. Thus, for 
example, one can compare the tax expenditures and ACA categories 
with the administration and procedure category using each of those 
measures. 
Second, the figures group the categories into subsets based on 
the analysis in Part I. One subset consists of the five categories with 
the weakest relationship to the tax system’s traditional revenue-
raising function: tax expenditures, ACA, ERISA, exempt 
organizations, and campaign finance. As also discussed in Part I, 
however, other subject matter categories beyond those five possess 
 
 132. IRM 32.1.2.1–32.1.9.5. 
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histories and features that arguably support thinking about them in 
social welfare or regulatory terms. These categories tie closely to 
taxes that raise revenue but are also strongly associated with social 
welfare and regulatory objectives: the corporate category, which 
corresponds to the corporate income tax; the gifts, trusts, and estates 
category, which relates to the estate tax; and the non-ACA excise tax 
category. Both of the two subsets of categories are, in turn, subtotaled 
to the side of each figure. The third and final subset consists of 
categories that, with the possible exception of the administration and 
procedure category, enjoy the strongest relationship with the 
revenue-raising function. 
The administration and procedure category is particularly 
difficult to characterize as either more or less concerned with revenue 
raising than other subject matter categories. The administration and 
procedure category includes procedural regulations governing the 
filing of returns and the withholding, assessment, and collection of 
taxes, as well as penalties for noncompliance and other matters 
directly associated with revenue raising. The administration and 
procedure category also includes regulations governing the 
professional behavior of tax practitioners, implementing the IRS 
whistleblower program, and safeguarding taxpayer privacy.133 None of 
these matters pertains precisely to revenue raising, yet at the same 
time, they all do. As a result, characterizing documents and projects 
addressing these issues as either more or less oriented toward raising 
revenue seems especially debatable. To be conservative, the following 
figures group the administration and procedure category among those 
with the strongest relationship to the revenue-raising function. 
With that windup, as presented in Figure 2, a straight count of 
the major rulemaking documents studied shows that a substantial 
portion of those documents addresses programs and provisions other 
than traditional revenue raising.  
  
 
 133. For a breakdown of the administration and procedure category, see Appendix 3, Figure 
A3.3. 
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Figure 2. Straight Count of Major Rulemaking Documents 
Category Count Percent
Tax expenditures 80 17.8
Affordable Care Act 41 9.1
Exempt organizations 13 2.9
ERISA 11 2.4
Campaign finance 3 .7
Corporate/international that is 
primarily corporate 
89 19.8
Gifts, trusts, and estates 21 4.7
Non-ACA excise taxes 6 1.3




Partnerships and other non-
T&E pass through 
18 4.0
Employment taxes 5 1.1
Total 449 99.9[a]
[a] This column does not total precisely 100 percent due to rounding. 
 
Shifting the analysis from individual documents to regulation 
projects yields similar results, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Straight Count of Regulation Projects 
Category Count Percent
Tax expenditures 50 19.1
Affordable Care Act 18 6.9
Exempt organizations 9 3.4
ERISA 5 1.9
Campaign finance 1 0.4
Corporate/international that is 
primarily corporate 
50 19.1
Gifts, trusts, and estates 12 4.6
Non-ACA excise taxes 3 1.1




Partnerships and other non-
T&E pass through 
14 5.3
Employment taxes 3 1.1
Total 262 100.0
 
As Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate, between one-sixth and one-fifth of 
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revenue-raising tax expenditure items. Roughly another one-sixth 
concerned the relatively regulatory ACA, exempt organization, 
ERISA, and campaign finance categories. Taken together, almost 
one-third of the documents and projects studied—hardly a negligible 
proportion—addressed the programs and provisions least associated 
with traditional revenue raising. 
Shaded in Figures 2 and 3, the subset of categories that raise at 
least some revenue but are also strongly associated with social welfare 
and regulatory goals represent another one-fourth of the documents 
evaluated by this study. If one accepts the argument that the 
corporate income tax, the estate tax, and excise taxes exist as much or 
more to serve social welfare and regulatory purposes than to raise 
revenue, then the total number of documents and projects least 
associated with traditional revenue raising rises to well above half. 
Interestingly, the individual category, which consists principally 
of individual income tax matters that are not tax expenditures, and 
the employment taxes category together represented less than one-
sixth of the documents and regulation projects studied. When one 
considers that the individual income tax an employment taxes 
represent more than 85 percent of gross revenue collected by the IRS, 
the number of documents and projects associated with those taxes 
seems strikingly small. 
Lastly, it is notable that the administration and procedure 
category was the largest, representing more than one-fifth of the 
major rulemaking documents and regulation projects studied. In an 
informal conversation, one former Treasury official with whom I 
shared these results suggested that the relatively large number of 
documents and projects addressing administrative and procedural 
matters represents a substantial shift from twenty years ago. In fact, 
he was somewhat dismayed that administrative and procedural 
matters, rather than substantive interpretation, seem to consume such 
a large percentage of Treasury and IRS time and resources. If he is 
right in suggesting that this category has expanded over time, then 
one is left to wonder the reasons why. 
Evaluating the major rulemaking documents studied in terms of 
pages published yields results that are similar yet even more 
dramatically weighted toward the primarily non-revenue-raising 
categories. 
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Figure 4. Page Count of Major Rulemaking Documents 
Category Count Percent
Tax expenditures 575 17.2
Affordable Care Act 526 15.8
Exempt organizations 121 3.6
ERISA 138 4.1
Campaign finance 4 0.1
Corporate/international that is 
primarily corporate 
612 18.4
Gifts, trusts, and estates 243 7.3
Non-ACA excise taxes 11 .3




Partnerships and other non-
T&E pass through 
71 2.1
Employment taxes 31 0.9
Total 3,334 99.8[a]
[a] This column does not total precisely 100 percent due to rounding. 
 
According to Figure 4, the percentage of pages published in 
connection with tax expenditures roughly correlates with the number 
of documents and the number of projects. The percentages for pages 
published with respect to the relatively regulatory ACA and ERISA 
categories, however, went up—substantially so for the ACA category. 
Taken together, fully two-fifths of the pages published addressed 
programs and provisions that most obviously stand apart from the 
traditional revenue-raising function. Adding the three shaded 
categories brings that total up as well to two-thirds of the pages 
published. 
It might have been foreseeable that the largest difference 
between the counts for individual documents or projects and pages 
published comes from the ACA category. The ACA was enacted in 
2010, in the very middle of the period studied.134 Given the size and 
complexity of that legislation and the central role played in its 
implementation by Treasury and the IRS, it is unsurprising both that 
Treasury and the IRS have dedicated a significant part of their 
regulatory agenda since then to implementing that legislation and 
that many of the resulting NOPRs and TDs are especially lengthy. 
Whether Treasury and IRS efforts to administer the ACA will 
 
 134. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
40.8% 
66.8% 
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displace revenue raising or other social welfare and regulatory 
programs, purposes, and function to such a degree on an ongoing 
basis remains to be seen. 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding its recent enactment and 
complexity, the ACA was not the only category with large projects.  
 
Figure 5: Finalized Projects Over 50 Pages135 
Project subject Category Pages 
Use of actuarial tables in valuing 
annuities (§ 7520) 
Gifts, trusts, and estates 157 
Methods to determine taxable income in 
connection with a cost sharing 
arrangement (§ 482) 
Corporate/international 
that is primarily 
corporate
156 
Treatment of services; allocation of 
income and deduction from 
intangibles; stewardship expense 
(§ 482)
Corporate/international 
that is primarily 
corporate 
137 
Measurement of assets and liabilities for 
pension funding purposes (§§ 430, 
436) 
Tax expenditures 129 
Summary of benefits and coverage, 
glossary for group health plans 
(§ 9815) 
Affordable Care Act 128 
Unified rule for loss on subsidiary stock 
(§§ 358, 362, 1502) 
Corporate/international 
that is primarily 
corporate
110 
Special rules to reduce § 1446 









Source rules involving U.S. possessions 
and other conforming changes 
(§ 937(b)) 
Corporate/international 
that is primarily 
corporate
71 
Basis reporting by securities brokers 




Implementation of Form 990 (§§ 6033, 
6043) 
Exempt organizations 56 
 
 135. To avoid comparing apples with oranges, all of the projects presented in Figure 5 were 
taken from the 165 regulation projects for which Treasury and the IRS have published final 
regulations. Nevertheless, three projects that were still ongoing at the end of 2012 were already 
larger than some of those listed in Figure 5. Those three projects concerned the following topics: 
the deduction and capitalization of expenditures related to tangible property under I.R.C. § 263, 
categorized as individual/not obviously corporate; group health plans and health insurance 
issuers, implementing the ACA; and health insurance exclusions for preexisting conditions, also 
under the ACA.  
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Project subject Category Pages 
Religious accommodation for 
contraceptive coverage (§ 9815)
Affordable Care Act 54 
Application of separate limitations to 
dividends from noncontrolled § 902 
corporations (§ 904) 
Corporate/international 
that is primarily 
corporate
51 
Gain recognition agreements with 
respect to certain transfers of stock or 
securities by U.S. persons to foreign 
corporations (§ 367) 
Corporate/international 




As Figure 5 demonstrates, of the fifteen completed regulation 
projects totaling more than fifty pages, only two concern the ACA. 
Fully six of the twelve subject matter categories are represented 
among the largest projects, including tax expenditures and exempt 
organizations as well as the corporate and administration and 
procedure categories. On the other hand, the individual and 
employment tax categories were not represented. Overall, the 
average page count among the 165 final projects was slightly less than 
20 pages; only 46 projects, or less than 30 percent, were longer than 
that average. The categorization of those 46 projects resembles the 
other findings.  
 
Figure 6: Breakdown of 46 Final Projects Larger than Average 
Category Total Percent
Tax expenditures 8 17.4
Affordable Care Act 6 13.0
Exempt organizations 2 4.3
ERISA 1 2.2
Corporate/international that is 
primarily corporate 
12 26.1
Gifts, trusts, and estates 2 4.3




Partnerships and other non-
T&E pass through 
1 2.2
Employment taxes 1 2.2
Total 46 100.0
 
In summary, whether the focus is on documents, projects, or 
page counts, it is apparent that Treasury and the IRS commit 
substantial resources to adopting regulations that interpret, elaborate, 
and implement tax provisions aimed primarily at regulatory and 
36.9% 
67.3% 
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social welfare programs, purposes, and functions rather than raising 
revenue. Indeed, depending on how one perceives the corporate 
income tax, the estate tax, and non-ACA excise taxes, one could 
argue that Treasury and the IRS dedicate less of their regulatory 
effort to raising revenue than to other programs, purposes, and 
functions. At a minimum, Treasury and IRS expend comparatively 
little effort promulgating regulations concerning the revenue-raising 
aspects of the individual income tax and employment taxes, 
notwithstanding that those taxes together represent the vast majority 
of collections. Anecdotally, Treasury regulation drafters have been 
swamped for the past few years with implementing the massive ACA. 
The ACA is landmark legislation and thus may skew the data 
artificially away from revenue raising and yield anomalous results for 
the period studied. Nevertheless, as the above analysis indicates, 
ACA regulations do not dominate the other categories so 
dramatically as to leave other social welfare and regulatory efforts 
negligible relative to revenue raising. 
III.  POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The study documented by this Article provides merely a limited 
snapshot of Treasury and IRS tax administration efforts. More 
extensive study—covering a longer time frame or evaluating other 
aspects of IRS administration, for example—will provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the extent to which the attentions of 
Treasury and the IRS are focused on pursuing goals and 
administering programs with only a tangential relationship to the U.S. 
tax system’s traditional revenue-raising mission. 
Nevertheless, this study at least offers a fair indication of the 
contemporary mix of issues that drafters of Treasury regulations 
spend their time addressing. Like the I.R.C. itself, Treasury 
regulations carry the force and effect of law. Promulgating Treasury 
regulations is one of the most legally consequential actions that 
Treasury and the IRS undertake in administering the tax system. As 
noted, some instances of tax exceptionalism from general 
administrative-law norms and doctrines particularly concern Treasury 
regulations. Specifically, statutory provisions arguably limit pre-
enforcement judicial review of Treasury regulations and explicitly 
authorize retroactive effective dates for new Treasury regulations. 
Although I have addressed pre-enforcement review in prior work and 
will save more complete consideration of retroactivity for the future, I 
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would like to take the opportunity here to offer a few thoughts 
regarding the potential implications of this study in those areas. 
A. Pre-enforcement Judicial Review for Treasury Regulations 
The Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421(a), provides generally 
that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or 
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, 
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was 
assessed.”136 Correspondingly, the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) 
contains a tax exception that prevents courts from providing 
declaratory relief for controversies “with respect to Federal taxes.”137 
Courts generally have interpreted these provisions as operating 
coextensively138 and as substantially limiting judicial review of tax 
cases outside of statutorily authorized refund and deficiency actions.139 
That said, most of the cases interpreting I.R.C. § 7421 and the 
DJA concern either tax protesters raising frivolous legal arguments 
already rejected by the courts140 or taxpayers asserting technicalities to 
avoid levies or property seizures for taxes clearly owed.141 In the 
 
 136. Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012). 
 137. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).  
 138. See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 727–31 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(analyzing the issue and holding in favor of coextensive interpretation); Ambort v. United 
States, 392 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 2004) (“In practical effect, these two statutes are 
coextensive . . . .”); Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 299 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he two 
statutory texts are, in underlying intent and practical effect, coextensive.” (quoting In re Leckie 
Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 583 (4th Cir. 1996) (quotation mark omitted))). 
 139. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 748–50 (1974) (reading I.R.C. 
§ 7421(a) and the DJA as precluding judicial review of an IRS threat to withdraw an 
organization’s exempt status on the ground that allowing the suit could have an indirect effect of 
reducing the tax burdens of the organization’s contributors); Enochs v. Williams Packing & 
Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962) (identifying the purpose of I.R.C. § 7421(a) and the DJA as 
“permit[ting] the United States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial 
intervention, and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for 
refund”).  
 140. See, e.g., Shrock v. United States, No. 95-3927, 1996 WL 414177, at *1 (7th Cir. July 22, 
1996) (calling tax protestor’s claims “frivolous” and “repeatedly rejected”); Gassei v. Dep’t of 
Justice, No. 91-6400, 1992 WL 149981, at *2 (10th Cir., Nov. 2, 1992) (rejecting taxpayer’s 
argument as clearly contrary to controlling circuit precedent); Purk v. United States, Nos. 89-
37989, 89-3790, 1990 WL 12188, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 1990) (observing that “other courts have 
rejected similar claims” to that raised by the taxpayer).  
 141. See, e.g., Weiler v. United States, No. 94-56465, 1996 WL 169254, at *4 (9th Cir. Apr. 
10, 1996) (finding the record “replete with evidence” that IRS assessments were valid); Nuttle v. 
IRS, No. 95-2089, 1995 WL 643106, at *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 2, 1995) (declining to enjoin the 
collection of taxes recognized as due by the Tax Court so that the taxpayer could avoid posting 
an appeal bond); Knight v. United States, No. 93-35039, 1993 WL 140589, at *2 (9th Cir. May 4, 
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1970s, the Supreme Court cited I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA in 
declining to consider constitutional challenges to IRS ruling letters 
denying or revoking exempt organization status under I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3).142 In response, Congress adopted a statutory exception for 
such rulings.143 The Court also cited I.R.C. § 7421 in declining to 
consider the merits of a Vietnam War–era constitutional challenge by 
war protesters to income tax withholding in which the taxpayers 
conceded that they would likely lose a refund action and that they 
merely wanted the opportunity to decline to pay their taxes and to 
require the government to levy.144 
By contrast, case law regarding whether I.R.C. § 7421 and the 
DJA preclude pre-enforcement judicial review of Treasury 
regulations is both limited and mixed. The Supreme Court has never 
addressed the question. In California v. Regan,145 the Ninth Circuit 
decided that regulations requiring third-party reporting of pension-
plan data would “have an impact on the assessment of federal taxes” 
by enabling the IRS to evaluate individual beneficiaries’ claims to 
favorable tax treatment and thus could not be reviewed pre-
enforcement.146 Similarly, in Foodservice & Lodging Institute v. 
Regan,147 the D.C. Circuit concluded that regulations governing how 
restaurant employers allocate and report tip income among 
employees “plainly concern[ed] the assessment or collection of” those 
employees’ federal taxes and were thus unreviewable pre-
enforcement.148 
Also in Foodservice & Lodging Institute, however, the D.C. 
Circuit concluded that I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA did not preclude a 
pre-enforcement challenge to a regulation that required restaurants 
to report tips received so that the IRS could evaluate tip compliance 
in the restaurant industry, reasoning that regulation “[did] not relate 
to the assessment or collection of taxes.”149 More recently, in Cohen v. 
 
1993) (refusing to enjoin the collection for lack of deficiency notice because the I.R.C. did not 
require notice). 
 142. Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 761–63 (1974); Bob Jones Univ., 
416 U.S. at 736–48. 
 143. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1306(a), (b)(8), 90 Stat. 1520, 1717, 
1719–20 (1976) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7428(a) (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)). 
 144. United States v. Am. Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7, 10–12 (1974) (per curiam). 
 145. California v. Regan, 641 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 146. Id. at 722 (emphasis added). 
 147. Foodservice & Lodging Inst. v. Regan, 809 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
 148. Id. at 844 (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. at 846. The D.C. Circuit went on to uphold the regulation as reasonable. Id. at 847. 
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United States,150 the D.C. Circuit allowed an APA procedural 
challenge against an IRS notice to proceed outside the usual channels 
of refund and deficiency actions.151 The Cohen case did not involve a 
pre-enforcement challenge, precisely, as the taxes at issue had already 
been paid, and the Cohen court was careful to restrict its justiciability 
determination to the case’s facts and circumstances.152 Nevertheless, 
much of the Cohen court’s reasoning could be extended to allow 
other APA procedural challenges to proceed pre-enforcement. Since 
the D.C. Circuit decided Cohen, at least one district court has 
declined to apply I.R.C. § 7421 to dismiss a pre-enforcement APA 
challenge to the validity of a Treasury regulation. In Florida Bankers 
Ass’n v. United States Department of Treasury,153 the district court 
allowed a pre-enforcement APA challenge against information 
reporting regulations implementing the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act to proceed notwithstanding the Anti-Injunction Act, 
citing the D.C. Circuit decisions in both Foodservice & Lodging 
Institute and Cohen.154 Also in the D.C. Circuit, the government did 
not even raise the question of reviewability in Loving v. IRS155—a pre-
enforcement challenge to the validity of Treasury regulations that 
would impose competency testing, continuing education, and ethics 
requirements on tax return preparers.156 
Nevertheless, in Halbig v. Sebelius,157 another district court held 
that I.R.C. § 7421 precluded judicial review of a pre-enforcement 
APA challenge to Treasury regulations concerning health insurance 
premium tax credits under the ACA.158 Also citing Cohen, the Halbig 
court concluded that because the credits would, in turn, would trigger 
certain assessments on employers under I.R.C. § 4980H, and those 
 
 150. Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc).  
 151. Id. at 734 (“Allowing judicial review of Appellants’ APA suit is consistent with the 
APA’s underlying purpose . . . .”) 
 152. Id. at 725–26.  
 153. Fla. Bankers Ass’n. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 13-529 (JEB), 2014 WL 114519 
(D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2014). 
 154. Id. at *6–7. 
 155. Loving v. IRS, No. 13-5061, 2014 WL 519224 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 2014). 
 156. See generally Brief for the Appellants, Loving v. IRS, No. 13-5061, 2014 WL 519224 
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2013), 2013 WL 1282685 (failing to address reviewability); Defendants’ 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-cv-
00385-JEB), 2012 WL 8133439 (same). 
 157. Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-623 (PLF), 2014 WL 129023 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2014) 
 158. Id. at *8–11. 
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assessments served a revenue-raising function, the Anti-Injunction 
Act precluded the employers’ suit.159 
The relevant statutory text is sufficiently open to interpretation, 
and case law in the area is so limited, that courts have some latitude 
in deciding whether to interpret I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA to allow 
pre-enforcement judicial review of Treasury regulations. Focusing on 
the importance of the IRS’s revenue-raising function, the Supreme 
Court in the 1960s and 1970s embraced a broad construction of what 
it means to restrain tax assessment and collection that would seem to 
preclude just about any tax case outside of statutory refund or 
deficiency actions. By contrast, at least some of the more recent court 
opinions have adopted narrow interpretations of “assessment” and 
“collection” to allow APA challenges to proceed.160 
The leading Supreme Court case supporting a broad application 
of I.R.C. § 7421—Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,161 
decided in 1962—emphasized the IRS’s revenue-raising function: 
“The manifest purpose of [I.R.C. § 7421] is to permit the United 
States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial 
intervention . . . .”162 If courts perceive that an increasing number of 
new Treasury regulations are more oriented toward non-revenue-
raising programs and goals, however, they may be more inclined to 
construe pre-enforcement challenges to those regulations as 
unrelated to the assessment and collection of taxes, and thus beyond 
the scope of I.R.C. § 7421. 
Regardless of what the courts do, Congress should revisit the 
scope of I.R.C. § 7421 and the DJA. Although protecting the fisc is an 
important goal, Congress has previously signaled its recognition that 
some circumstances warrant extending pre-enforcement judicial 
review. As noted above, Congress adopted an exception from I.R.C. 
§ 7421 and the DJA in response to Supreme Court decisions 
precluding judicial review of IRS rulings denying or revoking exempt 
 
 159. Id. at *11. 
 160. Fla. Bankers Ass’n, 2014 WL 114519, at *6; Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (en banc); see Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 100–02 (2004) (interpreting similar 
language in 28 U.S.C. § 1341). But see Halbig, 2014 WL 129023, at *9 (applying I.R.C. § 7421 to 
preclude judicial review of pre-enforcement APA challenge to a regulation governing a tax 
credit because the plaintiffs’ ultimate goal was to “restrain” the IRS from assessing a related 
excise tax). 
 161. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962).  
 162. Id. at 7. 
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organization status.163 Congress could again contemplate adopting 
language that would further narrow the scope of I.R.C. § 7421 and the 
DJA to bring judicial review of Treasury regulations in closer 
alignment with administrative-law norms. 
B. Retroactivity 
For space reasons, this study did not attempt to evaluate 
regulations’ effective dates; I instead chose to save a more thorough 
examination of that issue for future work. Nevertheless, this study 
demonstrates the merits of considering in greater depth the ability of 
Treasury and the IRS to adopt retroactive Treasury regulations. 
I.R.C. § 7805(b) authorizes Treasury to make final regulations 
apply retroactively to the date Treasury published a related proposed 
or temporary regulation in the Federal Register, and to make both 
final and temporary regulations apply retroactively to the date 
Treasury or the IRS issued a public notice substantially describing the 
regulation’s expected contents.164 I.R.C. § 7805(b) goes on to offer 
several additional circumstances in which Treasury is authorized to 
adopt retroactively effective regulations, including when Treasury 
adopts a regulation within eighteen months after Congress enacts the 
related statutory language;165 when Treasury seeks “to prevent 
abuse”;166 or when Treasury endeavors to correct procedural defects.167 
Notwithstanding its breadth, the current language of I.R.C. 
§ 7805(b) represents a contraction of Treasury’s authority to adopt 
retroactive regulations. Prior to 1996, Treasury regulations were 
presumed to apply retroactively to the date that Congress enacted the 
related statutory language unless Treasury exercised its discretion to 
provide otherwise.168 In 1996, Congress substantially amended I.R.C. 
§ 7805 to remove that presumption and to authorize retroactivity only 
 
 163. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.  
 164. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1) (2012). The same provision gives Treasury the third and obvious 
option of making final and temporary regulations apply as of the date on which Treasury files 
them in the Federal Register, but doing so would not make said regulations retroactive.  
 165. Id. § 7805(b)(2).  
 166. Id. § 7805(b)(3). 
 167. Id. § 7805(b)(4). 
 168. See BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 46.04[3] (2002) (documenting the history of Treasury’s 
authority to adopt regulations with retroactive effect). 
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under specified circumstances, which as noted nevertheless remain 
quite broad.169 
Prior to 1996, courts reviewed Treasury’s decision to apply its 
regulations retroactively for abuse of discretion based on the several 
factors, such as whether the regulation in question changed the law, 
whether the taxpayer had justifiably relied on prior pronouncements, 
and whether retroactively applying the regulation would yield overly 
harsh results.170 Since 1996, courts have had few opportunities to 
consider the scope of Treasury’s authority to adopt retroactively 
effective regulations. A few cases discuss what it means for a 
regulation to prevent abuse, but they all concern a single regulation—
Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6—which requires a partner to reduce its 
basis in a partnership interest when the partnership assumes certain 
liabilities of the partner.171 Although one court addressing this issue 
concluded both that Congress authorized retroactivity and that the 
regulation would prevent abuse,172 another district court and the 
Court of Federal Claims have found that retroactive effect was 
neither authorized nor a proper exercise of preventing abuse.173 The 
continued vitality of pre-1996 factors for assessing abuse of discretion 
remains undetermined.174 
 
 169. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1101(a), 110 Stat. 1452, 1468 (1996) 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7805). The amended statute applies only to regulations relating 
to statutory provisions enacted on or after July 30, 1996. Id. § 1101(b). 
 170. E.g., Gehl Co. v. Comm’r, 795 F.2d 1324, 1332–34 (7th Cir. 1986); Baker v. United 
States, 748 F.2d 1465, 1467 (11th Cir. 1984); Wilson v. United States, 588 F.2d 1168, 1173 (6th 
Cir. 1978); Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d 972, 981 (5th Cir. 1977); Chock 
Full O’Nuts v. United States, 453 F.2d 300, 302 n.6 (2d Cir. 1973); see Dixon v. United States, 
381 U.S. 68, 80 (1965) (“Congress has seen fit to allow the Commissioner to correct mistakes of 
law, and in § 7805(b) has given him a large measure of discretion in determining when to apply 
his corrections retroactively. In the circumstances of this case we cannot say that this discretion 
was abused.”); John S. Nolan & Victor Thuronyi, Retroactive Application of Changes in IRS or 
Treasury Department Position, 61 TAXES 777, 783 (1983) (“More recently, courts have taken the 
approach that any retroactive application of a regulation may be reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, although such abuse is rarely found.”). 
 171. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 (2005). 
 172. Maguire Partners-Master Invs., LLC v. United States, No. CV 06-07371-JFW(RZx), 
2009 WL 4907033, at *19 & n.4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009) (“[T]he Treasury Department simply 
applied the pre-existing rule contained in Revenue Ruling 88–77 to address the possibility of 
abuse . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 173. Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (2008), rev’d on other grounds, 613 F.3d 
1249 (10th Cir. 2010); Murfam Farms, LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516 (2009); Stobie 
Creek Invs., LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (2008). 
 174. For an interesting discussion of judicial review of Treasury regulation retroactivity 
under the current I.R.C. § 7805(b), see generally Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Abuse 
According to Whom?, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2013). 
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As noted in the Introduction, Treasury’s authority to adopt 
retroactive regulations is unusual among administrative agencies. The 
administrative-law norm against retroactive rulemaking is rooted in 
popular notions regarding fair notice and the rule of law.175 
Retroactive rulemaking may still make sense in the tax context as a 
mechanism for combating tax shelters or other abuses. Given the 
extent to which Treasury regulates in areas less obviously related to 
the tax system’s traditional revenue-raising mission, however, further 
study is warranted to assess how Treasury and the IRS exercise their 
discretionary authority under I.R.C. § 7805(b). Rather than leaving 
Treasury and the IRS with such broad authority to make all of their 
regulations retroactive, Congress could and perhaps ought to consider 
further curtailing that power. For example, authorizing retroactivity 
only to counter abusive transactions could protect the revenue-raising 
function while bringing other, less revenue-oriented aspects of the tax 
system into closer alignment with general administrative-law norms. 
In the meantime, however, greater judicial awareness of the scope of 
Treasury and IRS administrative efforts in other, non-revenue-raising 
areas may prompt the courts to examine Treasury and IRS decisions 
to adopt retroactive regulations with a more critical eye. 
C. IRS Reform 
Although the study documented in this Article evaluated only 
Treasury regulations rather than IRS resource utilization more 
broadly, the division of Treasury’s priorities has implications for the 
IRS that are worth at least preliminary consideration. In particular, 
despite occasional nods to customer service and a spiffy, separate 
website focused on the EITC and other refundable tax credits,176 the 
IRS’s cultural orientation toward raising revenue and collecting taxes 
may risk undermining the effectiveness of programs and provisions 
aimed at alleviating poverty and providing financial support to 
working families.177 But aspects of that culture, too, may make the IRS 
less than ideal choices to serve a wide array of regulatory functions 
that have historically fallen to other, more traditional administrative 
agencies. 
 
 175. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).  
 176. EITC & Other Refundable Credits, supra note 65. 
 177. For acknowledgement of scholarly debate over this issue, see supra note 64 and 
accompanying text. 
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As David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim have argued, the decision 
to utilize the tax system to implement government spending programs 
is fundamentally a choice about institutional design.178 To date, 
Congress seems not to have thought too deeply about the matter, 
instead simply seeing the IRS as an existing and convenient 
bureaucracy for administering many seemingly small, as well as some 
rather large, nontax programs. As a result, the IRS has transitioned 
over time from a mission-driven agency that collects taxes to an 
omnibus agency that does many things, without careful consideration 
of the administrative consequences of that transition. Is it too much to 
ask the IRS to maximize congressional goals of serving low-income 
families, providing health care, protecting pensions, monitoring the 
nonprofit sector, and encouraging economic growth while 
simultaneously serving as the federal government’s accounts 
receivable department? At a minimum, applying the old revenue-
collection toolbox in pursuing all of these government programs, 
purposes, and functions seems likely to achieve suboptimal outcomes. 
Although this study alone may not impel a restructuring of the IRS, 
and I will leave further thoughts about IRS reform for future work, it 
at least seems plausible at this point to suggest that the tax system 
may be reaching an organizational tipping point of being stretched 
too thin between too many, arguably competing goals—not just in 
terms of raw resources, but with respect to institutional capacity. 
CONCLUSION 
It is important to underscore that this study offers only a 
preliminary analysis of the allocation of Treasury and IRS 
administration efforts between raising revenue and other programs, 
purposes, and functions. In particular, the IRS does much more than 
help Treasury draft regulations. Further study is warranted. 
Nevertheless, the outcome of this study ought at least to give 
some pause to defenders of tax exceptionalism who base their 
arguments on the importance of raising revenue and protecting the 
fisc from abusive transactions and structures. Courts should approach 
such arguments skeptically, and Congress should contemplate more 
seriously the potential administrative-law implications of situating 
nontax programs in the IRC. 
 
 178. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 65, at 957 (“[T]he tax expenditure decision, which 
we will also call the integration decision or the decision to combine tax and spending programs, 
is solely a matter of institutional design.”) 
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APPENDIX 1: 
METHODOLOGY—DEFINING A TREASURY REGULATION PROJECT 
As noted in Part II of the Article, for most Treasury regulation 
projects, Treasury and the IRS will publish at least one NOPR and 
one TD. A standard regulation project will contain only one of each, 
as Treasury and the IRS first propose a set of regulations and then 
finalize them after giving the public an opportunity to comment. For 
many other projects, Treasury and the IRS publish a TD with legally 
binding, temporary regulations simultaneously with the NOPR, and 
then replace or withdraw the temporary regulations with a second TD 
that contains the final regulations.179 Sometimes, Treasury and the 
IRS will publish more than one TD with temporary regulations and 
more than one NOPR before issuing a final TD. On very rare 
occasions, Treasury and the IRS publish a TD with final regulations 
without also publishing a NOPR or allowing an opportunity for public 
comment. Some NOPRs, and even certain TDs with temporary 
regulations, are withdrawn without ever being finalized. Some 
NOPRs remain open, seemingly in perpetuity. As previously 
documented, Treasury occasionally publishes documents with other 
titles that nevertheless contribute substantively to a regulation 
project.180 In short, a single Treasury regulation project may contain 
anywhere from one to several major documents. 
The most useful way of identifying which major rulemaking 
documents constitute a single project is to compare one or both of the 
CASE-MIS number and the RIN listed on each document.181 The 
Internal Revenue Manual instructs IRS attorneys to obtain a CASE-
MIS number when opening a regulation project and to continue using 
that project number until Treasury publishes a final regulation or 
closes the project without issuing regulations. Most NOPRs include 
the project’s CASE-MIS number in their title sections, although most 
TDs do not. Most TDs do, however, mention the project’s CASE-
MIS number when referring to the associated NOPR in the 
 
 179. See IRM 32.1.1.3 (Aug. 11, 2004) (describing IRS use of temporary regulations).  
 180. For discussion of other major rulemaking documents evaluated in the study, see supra 
notes 121–23 and accompanying text. 
 181. See IRM 32.1.2.2 (Aug. 11, 2004) (explaining the purpose of the CASE-MIS); id. 
32.1.2.2.5 (Aug. 11, 2004) (instructing drafting attorneys to obtain an RIN for each regulation 
project from the Regulatory Information Service Center of the General Services 
Administration). 
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background section of the preamble text. Separately, the Internal 
Revenue Manual instructs IRS attorneys to use the RIN in the 
heading of any regulation published in the Federal Register and also 
to use that same RIN for both final regulations and their associated 
NOPRs.182 
With a very straightforward project that contains a single NOPR 
and TD, all of the documents will bear the same RIN. The Internal 
Revenue Manual goes on to instruct, however, that if a single NOPR 
leads to more than one TD containing final regulations, new RINs 
should be obtained for the later TDs.183 Also, when Treasury 
publishes a TD with temporary regulations and simultaneously 
publishes a NOPR that proposes those same regulations by cross-
referencing the TD, the Internal Revenue Manual calls for the TD 
and the NOPR to have different RINs.184 Consequently, it is not 
uncommon for a Treasury regulation project with one or more sets of 
temporary regulations to bear multiple RINs. Often, references to the 
CASE-MIS number remain consistent throughout, thereby 
facilitating grouping. 
Nevertheless, even with the CASE-MIS numbers and RINs, 
idiosyncrasies occasionally present additional grouping challenges. 
For example, Treasury and the IRS sometimes will pursue 
simultaneously more than one project interpreting a particular I.R.C. 
section. Even if different Treasury and IRS attorneys work on these 
simultaneous projects, one would expect them to confer with one 
another. Should two projects that overlap with respect to both timing 
and I.R.C. section, but do not cross-reference one another in their 
NOPRs and TDs, be treated as a single project? If Treasury formally 
identified the documents as comprising two separate projects, for 
example by assigning different CASE-MIS numbers, I did as well. 
Also, Treasury and the IRS sometimes will publish a TD with 
final regulations that explicitly leaves open a particular issue and 
then, on the same day or shortly thereafter, will publish another 
NOPR, or even a TD with temporary regulations, addressing that 
same issue and discussing the first TD as part of its background 
section. Again, the two successive projects presumably are staffed by 
the same Treasury and IRS attorneys who might reasonably consider 
the latter NOPR or TD as simply continuing a larger project that 
 
 182. Id. 32.1.2.2.5.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. 
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includes the earlier documents. On other occasions, it may be months 
or even years before Treasury and the IRS issue a NOPR or TD with 
temporary regulations to address an issue left open by an earlier TD. 
The longer the break between the two events, the less likely it seems 
that the same team of attorneys were involved. Yet, the later NOPR 
or TD may still cross-reference and describe the earlier regulation 
project. Should two successive projects that address related issues and 
cross-reference one another in this way ever be combined? If so, then 
is there some point at which too much time has passed between 
projects to consider them so related? Again, I have generally 
followed the government’s lead: where Treasury and the IRS formally 
classified the documents as separate projects, for example by 
assigning different CASE-MIS numbers, so did I. On at least one 
occasion, however, Treasury and the IRS finalized one set of 
temporary and proposed regulations in the same TD as it adopted a 
new, second set of temporary regulations, which it then 
simultaneously proposed with a NOPR in the same edition of the 
Federal Register. In that case, because Treasury and the IRS 
combined the two, arguably separate projects into a single TD, I 
treated these efforts as a single project. 
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APPENDIX 2: 
DETAILS REGARDING TDS AND NOPRS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY 
Although Treasury and the IRS typically publish all TDs in both 
the Federal Register and the Internal Revenue Bulletin, publication 
in the Internal Revenue Bulletin typically occurs some weeks after 
publication in the Federal Register. Consequently, as listed in Figure 
A2.1, the study includes seven TDs published in the Federal Register 
in 2007, but in the Internal Revenue Bulletin in 2008. 
 
Figure A2.1. TDs Included Despite 2007 Federal Register Publication 
Treasury 
Decision Internal Revenue Bulletin Cite Federal Register Cite 
T.D. 9374 2008-10 I.R.B. 521 
(Mar. 10, 2008) 
72 Fed. Reg. 74,175 (Dec. 31, 2007) 
T.D. 9373 2008-8 I.R.B. 463 (Feb. 25, 2008) 72 Fed. Reg. 74,192 (Dec. 31, 2007) 
T.D. 9372 2008-8 I.R.B. 462 (Feb. 25, 2008) 72 Fed. Reg. 73,261 (Dec. 27, 2007) 
T.D. 9371 2008-8 I.R.B. 447 (Feb. 25, 2008)  72 Fed. Reg. 72,592 (Dec. 21, 2007) 
T.D. 9370 2008-7 I.R.B. 419 (Feb. 19, 2008) 72 Fed. Reg. 72,606 (Dec. 21, 2007) 
T.D. 9369 2008-6 I.R.B. 394 (Feb. 11, 2008) 72 Fed. Reg. 72,929 (Dec. 26, 2007) 
T.D. 9368 2008-6 I.R.B. 382 (Feb. 11, 2008) 72 Fed. Reg. 72,582 (Dec. 21, 2007) 
 
Also, as listed in Figure A2.2, the study includes six TDs published in 
the Federal Register in 2012, but in the Internal Revenue Bulletin in 
2013. 
 
Figure A2.2. TDs Included Despite 2013 Internal Revenue Bulletin 
Publication 
Treasury 
Decision Internal Revenue Bulletin Cite Federal Register Cite 
T.D. 9608 2013-3 I.R.B. 274 (Jan. 14, 2013) 77 Fed. Reg. 76,400 (Dec. 28, 2012) 
T.D. 9607 2013-6 I.R.B. 469 (Feb. 4, 2013) 77 Fed. Reg. 76,380 (Dec. 28, 2012) 
T.D. 9606 2013-11 I.R.B. 586 
(Mar. 11, 2013) 
77 Fed. Reg. 75,844 (Dec. 26, 2012) 
T.D. 9605 2013-11 I.R.B. 587 
(Mar. 11, 2013) 
77 Fed. Reg. 76,382 (Dec. 28, 2012) 
T.D. 9603 2013-3 I.R.B. 273 (Jan. 14, 2013) 77 Fed. Reg. 72,923 (Dec. 7, 2012) 
T.D. 9601 2013-10 I.R.B. 533 (Mar. 4, 2013 77 Fed. Reg. 66,915 (Nov. 8, 2012) 
 
Similarly, although Treasury and the IRS typically publish all NOPRs 
in both the Federal Register and the Internal Revenue Bulletin, 
publication in the Internal Revenue Bulletin typically occurs some 
weeks after publication in the Federal Register. Consequently, as 
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listed in Figure A2.3, the study includes eight NOPRs published in 
the Federal Register in 2007, but in the Internal Revenue Bulletin in 
2008. 
 
Figure A2.3. NOPRs Included Despite 2007 Federal Register 
Publication 
CASE-MIS 
Number Internal Revenue Bulletin Cite Federal Register Cite 
REG-111583-07 2008-4 I.R.B. 319 (Jan. 28, 2008) 72 Fed. Reg. 74,233 
(Dec. 31, 2007) 
REG-139236-07 2008-9 I.R.B. 491 (Mar. 3, 2008) 72 Fed. Reg. 74,215 
(Dec. 31, 2007) 
REG-147290-05 2008-10 I.R.B. 576 (Mar. 10, 2008) 72 Fed. Reg. 74,213 
(Dec. 31, 2007) 
REG-104946-07 2008-11 I.R.B. 596 (Mar. 17, 2008) 72 Fed. Reg. 73,680 
(Dec. 28, 2007) 
REG-104713-07 2008-6 I.R.B. 409 (Feb. 11, 2008) 72 Fed. Reg. 72,970 
(Dec. 26, 2007) 
REG-141399-07 2008-8 I.R.B. 470 (Feb. 25, 2008) 72 Fed. Reg. 72,646 
(Dec. 21, 2007) 
REG-114126-07 2008-6 I.R.B. 410 (Feb. 11, 2008) 72 Fed. Reg. 72,645 
(Dec. 21, 2007) 
REG-147832-07 2008-8 I.R.B. 472 (Feb. 25, 2008) 72 Fed. Reg. 74,246 
(Dec. 21, 2007) 
 
Also, as listed in Figure A2.4, the study includes three NOPRs that 
were published in the Federal Register in 2012, but in the Internal 
Revenue Bulletin in 2013. 
 
Figure A2.4. NOPRs Included Despite 2013 Internal Revenue Bulletin 
Publication 
CASE-MIS 
Number Internal Revenue Bulletin Cite Federal Register Cite 
REG-155929-06 2013-11 I.R.B. 650 (Mar. 11, 2013) 77 Fed. Reg. 76,426 
(Dec. 28, 2012) 
REG-141066-09 2013-3 I.R.B. 289 (Jan. 14, 2013) 77 Fed. Reg. 74,798 
(Dec. 18, 2012) 
REG-122707-12 2013-5 I.R.B. 450 (Jan. 28, 2013) 77 Fed. Reg. 70,620 
(Dec. 18, 2012) 
 
Finally, although Treasury publishes most TDs and NOPRs in both 
the Federal Register and the Internal Revenue Bulletin, as listed in 
Figures A2.5 and A2.6, one TD and one NOPR published in the 
HICKMAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2014  9:13 AM 
2014] ADMINISTERING THE TAX SYSTEM WE HAVE 1767 
Federal Register seem inadvertently to have missed publication in the 
Internal Revenue Bulletin. 
 
Figure A2.5. TD Not Published in Internal Revenue Bulletin 
Treasury 
Decision Internal Revenue Bulletin Cite Federal Register Cite 
T.D. 9578 n/a 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 
(Feb. 15, 2012) 
 
Figure A2.6. NOPR Not Published in Internal Revenue Bulletin 
CASE-MIS 
Number Internal Revenue Bulletin Cite Federal Register Cite 
REG-101826-11 n/a 76 Fed. Reg. 32,822 
(June 7, 2011) 
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APPENDIX 3: 
BREAKDOWNS OF LARGEST CATEGORIES 
The following tables supplement Figures 2, 3, and 4 of the Article 
by elaborating the makeup of the three largest categories. 
 














Net exclusion of pension 
contributions and earnings plans 
for employees and self-employed 
individuals 
26 307 19 
Items falling under the general 
business credit 
16 73 10 
Items related to state and local 
government bonds, including 
exclusion of interest on public 
purpose bonds and credit to 
holders of qualified zone activity 
bonds 
5 29 4 
Deferral and ratable inclusion of 
income arising from business 
indebtedness discharged by the 
reacquisition of a debt instrument
4 29 2 
Deduction for certain qualified film 
and television products 
4 12 2 
Deduction for domestic production 
activities 
2 21 2 
Special tax rate for nuclear 
decommissioning funds 
3 38 1 
Election to expense certain refineries 3 12 1 
Amortization of business start up 
costs 
3 10 1 
Income averaging for farmers and 
fishermen 
3 8 1 
Deduction for mortgage interest on 
owner-occupied residences
3 5 1 
Exclusion for health savings account 
contributions  
2 9 2 
Deduction for small refiners with 
capital costs associated with EPA 
sulfur regulation compliance
2 6 1 
Exclusion of damages on account of 
personal physical injury 
2 3 1 
Deduction for charitable 
contributions 
1 11 1 
Disaster relief provisions 1 3 1 
Totals 80 576[a] 50 
[a] The total for this column differs from the corresponding item in Figure 4 due to rounding. 
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Affiliated and controlled groups 
(§§ 267, 382, 1502, 1561, 1563)
24 161 14 
Subchapter C corporate/shareholder 
transactions and corporate 
reorganizations (§§ 301–368, 
381) 
22 131 15 
Transfer pricing (§ 482) 6 159 3 
Subchapter I insurance companies 
(§§ 801–848) 
2 8 2 
Source rules relating to foreign 
income (§§ 861–863) 
5 8 2 
Tax on income of foreign 
corporations/branch profits tax 
(§§ 881–884) 
4 16 3 
Foreign tax credits (§§ 901–909) 1 23 1 
Controlled foreign corporations 
(§§ 951–965, 1248) 
14 69 5 
Information return for taxpayers 
filing Form 5472—25% foreign 
owned U.S. corporations or 
foreign corporations engaged in 
U.S. trade or business (§ 6038A)
2 3 1 
Classification of foreign business 
entities (§ 7701) 
3 3 1 
Expatriated entities and their 
foreign parents (§ 7874)
6 30 3 
Total 89 611[a] 50 
[a] The total for this column differs from the corresponding item in Figure 4 due to rounding. 
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Regulation of tax practice (including 
Circular 230) 
16 98 9 
Tax return preparer penalties 4 81 2 
Third party information reporting 
and withholding: 
 
• Basis reporting by securities 
brokers 
3 76 2 
• Other withholding matters 12 67 6 
• Other third party 
information reporting
7 45 4 
Assessment and collection matters 9 43 7 
Filing and reporting matters 17 68 11 
Taxpayer penalties 9 27 4 
Whistleblower program 6 26 3 
Taxpayer privacy 11 24 6 
Awards of administrative costs and 
attorneys fees 
1 8 1 
Taxpayer assistance orders 2 6 1 
Measuring organizational and 
employee performance inside the 
IRS 
1 1 1 
Total 98 570[a] 57 
[a] The total for this column differs from the corresponding item in Figure 4 due to rounding. 
 
